



2016 specification
first exams in 2018 (2017 for AS)

Religion and Ethics Course Companion

For AS and A Level Year 1 OCR
Religious Studies (Component 2)

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Contents

Thank You for Choosing ZigZag Education.....	
Teacher Feedback Opportunity.....	
Terms and Conditions of Use	
Teacher's Introduction.....	
Key Terminology in Ethics	
Section 1: Normative Ethical Theories – ZigZag's Approaches	
1A: Natural Law	
1B: Situation	
Section 2: Normative Ethical Theories – Deontology and Teleology	
2A: Kantian Ethics	
2B: Utilitarianism	
Section 3: Applied Ethics.....	
3A: Euthanasia	
3B: Business Ethics	
Answers to Written Activities	

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Teacher's Introduction

This companion was written for the AS topics of the OCR Religion and Ethics specification with enough depth to be used on the full A Level course. It is split into three topics (Religion, Ethical Theories and Applied Ethics), each with two sections. Six chapters, in other words, perhaps only two occasions differed from the order in which the material is presented. The order of each section as a result is divided into a 'core knowledge' section (which covers theory, material) and an 'issues' section (which covers the critical discussion points). There are discussion points and group activities in each section. There is also a written activity in each section included at the back.

As ever, it was difficult to gauge the depth of understanding expected by the board towards AO2 material in the new specification, I have generally given more space to exposition. Although I have always strived to make the text as accessible as possible, I doubt only be of value to the most capable students. When I have been certain that the specification, I have marked it out as such. Nevertheless, OCR does advise teachers for referring to any *appropriate* scholarly views' and there is certainly nothing here

I have written several companions for other A Level Ethics curricula now (including a draft of this specification), and over that time have built up a fair old chunk of material. A previous version of this resource (written by C Walkey) at my disposal. So this resource should be of value to the marketing people call 'content-rich'. It may also be the last one I write, so I've tried to make it off. I hope it proves itself to be of some benefit to both yourself and your students.

Note on Suggested Reading

The suggested reading listed is not what I personally recommend, but what is recommended by the board. These recommendations – in my view – are better than most. The SCM Christian Ethics, listed for situation ethics, does not really spend all that much time discussing it (two pages, and not in the chapter suggested by the board). I surmised it was included because Fletcher's understanding of situation ethics is not 'really religious', but still considered 'religious'. At the other end of the spectrum, John Finnis's article on Aquinas's Moral, Political and Social Philosophy in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* is likely to be incomprehensible to most students. O'Neill's article 'Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems' is quite easy to read and is AO2 material for both Kant and the utilitarians. Likewise, Pojman (*Discovering Religion*) and Singer (*Practical Ethics; Rethinking Life and Death*) are good. The undergraduate textbook suggested by the board for Business Ethics is comprehensive and contains a good variety of interesting case studies.

Stretch and Challenge

Anything in a box like this is stretch and challenge, i.e. material not explicitly mentioned on the specification.

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KEY TERMINOLOGY IN ETHICS

Like any area of philosophy, ethics has its own set of specialised terminology. The and time again during this course and it is a good idea to know what each means. There will be a lot here to take in right now, some of which you may not presently understand. As you study this page as you study, you will soon become fluent in the language of ethics.

Ethics	the area of philosophy concerned with what behaviour is good or bad
Moral	actions, behaviour or intentions that are considered good
Immoral	actions, behaviour or intentions that are considered bad
Maxim	a moral rule
Moral/ethical theory	a set of ideas about ethics and how people should behave
Moral agent	someone involved in making ethical or moral decisions
Normative ethics	the branch of ethics which discusses what individuals should do. Typical questions include, 'What moral rules should people follow to be a good person?'
Consequentialist	term applied to ethical theories which judge whether an action is right on the basis of the consequences of the action, not the action itself
Deontological	term applied to ethical theories which make judgements on the basis of the intention of the moral agents or whether they are following a rule (e.g. Kantian deontology)
Teleological	term applied to ethical theories which are interested in the ends (the outcome), rather than the <i>means</i> (how they were carried out)
Absolutism	moral principle which holds that certain actions are either right or wrong for all people, at all times (e.g. Natural Law)
Relativism	moral principle which holds that what is right or wrong is relative to the culture (e.g. situation ethics)
Applied ethics	the application of ethical thinking to real-world issues
Objective	something which is part of mind-independent reality; a fact which is true regardless of age, culture, gender, etc.
Subjective	something which is mind-dependent, e.g. an opinion. It is true for some individuals, but not for others
Hedonism	belief that what is good is what is pleasurable
Sanctity of life	concept which holds that humanity is made in God's image and is inherently sacred
Quality of life	concept which holds that human life requires certain attributes (e.g. consciousness) in order to have value

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SECTION 1: NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORIES

RELIGIOUS APPROACHES

In the first section of the course you will be studying two theories of **normative** ethical approach to moral decision-making: St Thomas Aquinas's account of Natural Law, and utilitarianism. Each of these thinkers attempts to answer the question, one of life's most fundamental, 'What is the right thing to do?'

We start with the **absolutist** ethics of the medieval Catholic saint Aquinas, who held that there is a **Natural Law** which we can discover through the use of reason. In contrast to the **microscopic** turn to the situation ethics of the twentieth-century theologian John F. Fletcher, Aquinas holds a **teleological** view of morality, although he does share the

Activity:

Turn to the 'Key Terminology in Ethics' section at the start of this course comparing **absolutism** from the passage above.

1A: NATURAL LAW

Key Thinker	
Name	St Thomas Aquinas
Born	1225
Died	1274
Key text	<i>Summa Theologiae</i>
Why are they important?	There are few thinkers who have had more influence on the Catholic Church than St Thomas Aquinas, and there are few institutions which have shaped world history than the Catholic Church. As such, for a long time, the moral and intellectual landscape for large parts of the world was shaped by his teachings.
Did you know?	It is believed that Aquinas's relatives, disapproving of his decision to become a friar, once forcibly imprisoned him in the family castle in an attempt to change his mind. Legend has it that his brothers even resorted to hiring a prostitute to seduce Thomas away from a life of religious chastity. Not one to be deterred by the flesh, Aquinas is said to have driven her from his bedroom.

Telos

To fully understand Aquinas, it is also important to understand a little of Aquinas's metaphysics – a subject devoted to understanding the ultimate nature of reality. Aristotle's most significant insight is that, for anything to exist, it must have four causes:

- a material cause: e.g. the bronze of a statue
- a formal cause: e.g. the shape of a statue
- an efficient cause: e.g. the artist who makes the statue
- a final cause: e.g. the purpose of the statue

You will learn much more about this if you are also studying the Philosophy of Religion for present purposes, we only need to focus on the most important cause, which is the final cause. This is the purpose for which a thing was created and the purpose which it should fulfil.

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Aquinas took up Aristotle's idea of a final cause and combined it with Christian teaching about God. He reasoned that all humans have a natural purpose towards which God wants them to aim. This purpose will bring humans into unity and fellowship with God and enable the reaching of the highest human potential.

There were two sources Aquinas believed that humans could use to understand the purpose God had given humanity:

- 1) **The Bible and the world.** The Bible is considered divine revelation so it reveals or tells something about God. The world also reveals God's moral law because it was created by God and therefore has signs of its Creator in its design.
- 2) **Reason.** Aquinas believed very strongly in the ability of human reason to gain knowledge about God. Aquinas argued that through reason we could know what actions would fulfil our natural purpose.

To disparage the dictate of reason is equivalent to condemning the command of God. (II:ii, 19, 4)

Aquinas believed that humanity was given reason and freedom by God so that we would be able to discover and fulfil our natural purpose. All humans had the ability to reason, which meant all were able to follow natural moral law if they chose to.

Aquinas believed that everyone had a specific purpose unique to them that could be achieved by using the talents and abilities given to them by God.

In arguing this, Aquinas was something of a revolutionary. Earlier theologians, such as Augustine, believed that The Fall had corrupted mankind's nature and the inherent goodness in the world to such an extent that humans could not use reason to know anything about God. Humanity had fallen too far away from God to be able to use reason to know anything about God. Aquinas, however, although he acknowledged the implications of The Fall, did not interpret it as drastically. He believed that our nature was not completely corrupted and that we could still use reason to know God. He believed that our natural purpose could be used for the purpose of discovering and acting upon the natural moral law.



Biblical Support for Natural Law Theory

There are in fact numerous biblical passages which support the idea of a moral law written in nature:

For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities – his eternal power and divine nature – have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse. (Romans 1:20)

In this passage St Paul, the author of the Book of Romans, is describing how God created the world and therefore people have no excuse not to follow God's law. He is saying that God's law is written in nature and therefore people can know it by looking at the world around us.

Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. (Romans 2:14-16)

In this passage St Paul is describing how Gentiles (non-Jews) know the law from their own hearts or consciences. Paul is appealing to the fact that even those who do not have the Jewish law, but through their own hearts or consciences, know the natural moral law because God instilled it in everyone.

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Aquinas and Scholasticism

The reason Aquinas is considered such an important figure in the history of ethics is his synthesis of the thought of the pre-Christian Aristotle with biblical teaching. After the fall of the Ancient Greek and Roman civilisations, Aristotle's works had, for a long time, been largely forgotten in European civilisation. Fortunately, some of his writing had been preserved by Arab scholars, and, by the twelfth century, these works had gradually begun to spread, in translation, into Europe.

Due to his keen interest in these translations, Aquinas became a leading figure in the development of scholasticism. This was a particular way of doing theology that developed between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. It sought to systematise all Christian theology and prove that Christianity was rational. The use of reason was a defining feature of scholasticism and was used to determine exactly what church doctrine should be.

The Four Tiers of Law

When we hear the word 'law' these days we are prone to think of police officers, judges, and the legal system. For Aquinas, however, the law's scope was not just confined to what someone is able to get away with before they are imprisoned, fined or made to do community service. Instead, law is bound by reason; both divine and human. This is crucial to Aquinas's understanding of morality – laws were given to us by God, and we can work out what they are because God also implanted those laws in our rational faculties.

There are four different types of law for Aquinas, one of which is the natural moral law. They are arranged hierarchically:

Eternal Law

Incomprehensible to human beings, the Eternal Law is essentially the mind of God, and hence unchanging. It contains the mysteries of the universe's creation and its continued existence, and its true nature.

All the other forms of law, in a sense, reflect the Eternal Law.

Divine Law

The law revealed to us through the Bible and so appears to us as divine injunctions on how to live and how to reach heaven, yet it is only available to those who believe.

Natural Law

The moral law within us, which can be understood simply by reflecting on our rational nature. It is available to everyone, whether they believe in God or not; for Aquinas, it is so because it is part of the Eternal Law.

Human Law

This is closest to our modern understanding of the law. It is the law which governs human behaviour, which we can, or cannot, do legally.



* Note that Natural Law and Divine Law are two sides of the same coin, they both reveal God's law in different ways.

The Precepts

The Key Precept

At the heart of Natural Law theory is a single, uncontroversial moral principle from which we should aim to do good and to avoid doing evil.

Primary Precepts

Aquinas believed that through reason, the Bible and the world, it became clear that there were a number of 'primary precepts' that formed the basis of natural moral law. Although Aquinas did not provide a list himself, it is clear that he thought the following precepts were the most significant:

- 1) to preserve life
- 2) to reproduce
- 3) to educate children
- 4) to worship God
- 5) to create an orderly, harmonious society

Secondary Precepts

From these primary precepts, Aquinas argued that moral rules could be deduced for decision making so that humans can fulfil their natural purpose. Vardy describes this as 'unpacking' the primary precepts and telling the moral agents what they involve in practice.¹

For example, from the primary precept of 'live', the Catholic Church, whose ethical moral law, has argued for the immorality of abortion based on the view that it ends a human life. Similarly, the Catholic Church has argued that homosexual acts are immoral because they cannot lead to procreation, another primary precept.

Vardy comments that Aquinas allows some flexibility in how secondary precepts are deduced from primary precepts could be broken, how they were applied could vary according to circumstances.

Real and Apparent Goods

Aquinas distinguished between real and apparent goods. Real goods are actions consistent with natural purposes and are morally good. Apparent goods are actions that people think are real goods but they have been mistaken. They have not used their reason to reach a conclusion about how to act that is morally wrong and inconsistent with human nature. Apparent goods were arrived at by mistake, rather than deliberately.

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¹ Vardy, P and Grosche, P, *The Puzzle of Ethics* (London: Harper Collins), p.38.

Discussion Activity:

Imagine you are a Catholic priest who is regularly visited by troubled souls seeking help.

In groups, for each of the scenarios below, devise a relevant secondary precept referring to the primary precepts.

- a) Sky Sports 1 is televising the big game between Manchester United and Liverpool. The match clashes with Evening Mass.

One of your parishioners is a lifelong football fan and a regular churchgoer. He has recently been discovered in a state of inebriation and he is unsure how long he can stay in the Father's house.

- b) A changing government policy allows children to leave school at 14 if they are employed. Poorer families are torn between sending their children out to work or keep or allowing them to continue their studies.

One of your parishioners is struggling to make ends meet but is able to get by by job stacking shelves at the local Tesco. What do you advise, Father?

- c) A young married couple are unable to conceive a child. A doctor recommends IVF, but the procedure requires the husband, in isolation, to manually ejaculate into a container. You recently wed this young couple and know that they are devoted Catholics. What do you advise, Father?

- d) A single mother is made redundant and has no money to feed her three young children. In her weekly confession, she admits the temptation to steal is strong and constant. What do you advise, Father?

- e) A teenage girl is lured to the house of a close family friend and viciously raped. She discovers, to her horror, that she is pregnant and she cannot bear the thought of the child. Distraught, she turns to the Church for help. What do you advise, Father?

Issues**Does Natural Law provide a helpful method of moral decision-making?**

The catechism of the Catholic Church states that:

*'The Natural Law, present in the heart of each man and established by reason and its authority extends to all men... Application of the Natural Law varies according to reflection that takes account of various conditions of life according to place and time. Nevertheless, in the diversity of cultures, the Natural Law remains as a rule that is immutable and permanent throughout the variations of history; it sustains customs and supports their progress.'*²

These are weighty claims: Natural Law is said to be universal, absolute and unchanging. It is held to apply to all people, at all times and in all places with no exceptions. The problem with **absolutist** theories generally is that they tend to be inflexible. There may be circumstances where a normally forbidden will actually lead to the better outcome (this line of thinking is studied in the works of Joseph Fletcher).

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² Catechism of the Catholic Church 1956–1958

Proponents of Natural Law might point to the **secondary precepts** and the **doctrine of double effect** as evidence of their theory's real-world applicability. However, this does not solve a more substantive criticism of Natural Law which argues that any theory which relies on *reason* for moral decision-making is bound to be flawed due to its imperfect, limited nature. There is much also to say that our nature is not primarily rational, but emotional, and that we cannot be sure when our decisions are made from passion or from critical reflection.

Should we always judge something as good because it successfully achieves its *telos*?

Earthquakes, monsoons and tsunamis are all part of the natural order of things, yet we do not see them as *telos* or good. The question of how we reconcile a less than perfect world with a supremely perfect God is one for philosophers of religion, but it is enough to note that things doing what they were intended to do automatically makes them good. This is problematic for a theory which holds that good consists in fulfilling our natural purpose.

Does the universe as a whole really have a *telos*? Is human nature really oriented towards a purpose?

The French existentialist philosopher J P Sartre famously claimed that 'existence precedes essence' – the idea that humanity had a purpose (an 'essence') before it existed as an unjustified being. Sartre's view of human experience as radically free beings. This was intended as a slap in the face to Aristotle (who was heavily indebted), who maintain precisely the opposite.

Even if we do have a natural purpose, who is to say it is a good one? Aquinas would point to the existence of God, who could not knowingly create evil. Calvinists might take the opposite tack, however, and point to the *total depravity* of our nature as a result of original sin (this all stems, of course, from Adam and Eve's snack on the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden).

There are also issues with the notion that the universe, as a whole, has a *telos*. Countless discoveries in the natural sciences have been taken to suggest that the universe does not necessarily have the hallmarks of a beneficent God, or at the very least, lacks any kind of intrinsic purpose. The Second Law of Thermodynamics, for example, is often taken to mean that the universe tends towards *chaos* (this is because entropy – a measure of disorder in a physical system – always increases over time).

On the flip side, evolutionary neuroscientists such as Steven Pinker argue that some of our behaviours are determined genetically. Aquinas might well take such ideas as evidence against the purpose of all humankind.

The Natural Law scholar John Finnis writes that, even if Aquinas's claims about the purpose of the universe hold water, the theory as a whole can still have value. Hence Aquinas's moral philosophy is still valid in his theology:

*'[Aquinas' moral philosophy] is a fundamentally practical philosophy of principles which direct us to achieve as a man fulfillment so far as that happier we can be. It is both constituted and achieved by the pursuit of the actions that both manifest and bring about the excellences of character traditionally called virtues.'*³

Suggested Reading:
Finnis, J., 'Aquinas's Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

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³ Finnis, J, 'Aquinas' Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy', *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*

What actions can the doctrine of double effect justify?

Aquinas held that the primary precepts were **absolute**: they are rules which must be followed in all places. However, he also recognised that sometimes life throws up situations where doing good without also doing bad.

A classic example is the case of killing an attacker in self-defence. Aquinas himself discussed this case and reasoned that it is morally acceptable for an individual to kill in self-defence so long as that individual's *intention* was to preserve their own life rather than to harm another's. This came to be known as the **doctrine of double effect**.

In the Catholic Church, the doctrine has on occasion been used to justify abortion, usually if, by ending birth, the mother's life is put at risk. At such times, although there is a bad consequence (the death of an unborn foetus), the intention (to save the mother) is good. Nevertheless, the idea is problematic: we might intend to preserve our own life, but we do not also intend to end another's. We can, after all, have two intentions at once. I might intend to slake my thirst, but intend at the same time to get tipsy.

New Natural Law Theory

Some twentieth-century philosophers working within the Catholic tradition have sought to revitalise Aquinas's theory. Thinkers such as John Finnis and Germain Griesz have drawn on theologians such as Aquinas, working from the classical foundations of Aristotle, to develop a new 'big', metaphysical picture, and that this is detrimental to the practical application of the theory.

In its place, they have suggested a New Natural Law Theory which concentrates on (more abstract) qualities which are necessary for moral goodness. Griesz, for instance, distinguishes between two kinds: practical and moral. Practical goods are those things which help a person to achieve their purpose in life. Poverty, for instance, often hinders a person when it comes to moral development. A person who has no desire to start a family will not feed the starving family if the family is not started. This is not considered a *moral good* – it enables us to more easily do good things like charity. *Moral goods* are those which Aquinas, following Aristotle, labels virtues. These include justice, courage, temperance, and so forth. Griesz's insight is that possession of practical goods has a relationship with moral goods. For example, it is easier to be wise (a moral good) after a university education than it is much harder if you've received no education at all.

Written Activity 1: Aquinas's Natural Law Theory

1. Which ancient philosopher's metaphysical views influenced Aquinas's account of natural law?
2. What is the Greek term for 'purpose' or 'final cause'?
3. Natural law is one of the four tiers of law. What are the other three?
4. List Aquinas's five primary precepts.
5. How did Aquinas believe we could discern our God-given purpose?
6. What is the doctrine of double effect?

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1B: SITUATION ETHICS

Key Thinker	
Name	Joseph Fletcher
Born	1905
Died	1991
Key text	<i>Situation Ethics: The New Morality</i> (1966)
Why are they important?	Joseph Fletcher was one of the first theologians to realise the Church was out of touch with the shifts in moral and social attitudes during the 1960s. An Episcopalian priest, Fletcher courted controversy for his views on divorce and abortion, but he is best remembered today for his enduring influence at the heart of all ethical decision-making.
Did you know?	In later life, the once devout Fletcher was reported to have turned to atheism and become an atheist.

What is Situationalism?

Fletcher devised his theory of situational ethics amid the social turbulence of the 1960s, an era whose spirit Bob Dylan attempted to channel when he sang:

*Come mothers and fathers
Throughout the land
And don't criticize
What you can't understand
Your sons and your daughters
Are beyond your command
Your old road is rapidly agein'
Please get out of the new one if you can
For the times they are a-changin',
Please lend your hand*

Dylan was talking about the rise of a *counter-culture* which rejected the traditional values of a long time. It challenged both public and private life. In its place, a new morality of the 1960s eventually took hold. The reasons for this change are myriad and complex. Even in the 1960s saw such great upheavals in so many areas of life.

Fletcher, to his great credit, saw the writing on the wall. Unlike some more conservative theologians, he believed that Bible-thumping and moral condemnation was not a suitable response to the changing social attitudes. Equally, however, Fletcher did not think a life unconstrained by moral principles was desirable. What was needed instead was a marriage of the old with the new, a new set of ethics that would make it fit for a world very different to the one Aquinas or the Puritan writers had lived in. What was needed, was a **situational** approach.

Fletcher considered situationalism a middle way between two equally unattractive extremes (much like Aristotle considered each virtue to lie between two vices). On the one hand, an ethic that is completely lacking in any guiding moral principles, a position which many would argue people should be free to do whatever they see fit in any given situation. Fletcher termed this approach **antinomianism**, which literally translates from the Ancient Greek as 'against the law'. At the opposite end of the spectrum, are those moral philosophies which hold that ethical decisions should always be made in accordance with a set of strict rules or commands. Fletcher termed this approach **legalism**, because, like the legal system, it was concerned with the proper application of laws.


Situationalism is positioned in the middle of the two. On the one hand, unlike the antinomian, Fletcher believes people must have some principle or concept to appeal to in making a decision. This is agape, and the maxims derived from it. On the other, unlike the legalist, Fletcher believes principles cannot be so absolute and inflexible as to require a decision which flies in the face of the situation.

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This ethical theory is **teleological** because it is concerned with the outcome of actions. It is also a form of **relativistic ethic** because it is concerned with the demonstration of love. This means that what is considered to be a good action is relative to the situation. Sometimes lying could be the right thing to do, if it will result in showing love. This is a form of **relativistic ethic**.



Agape

'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself'
Matthew 22:38

Central to Fletcher's ethical system is the notion of 'agape', a Greek term which is the Christian ideal of selfless love. Agape is love that should be shown regardless of whether the person is a friend or not. It is not about developing a personal relationship or love in the personal sense. The right attitude is to show love to all. Agapeistic love is about expecting nothing in return because you know showing love to them is right. This is different from friendships which are based on receiving friendship and certain treatment in return.

One way to get a firmer grasp on what exactly agape is, is to consider what it is not. C.S. Lewis is largely remembered for his series of children's books *The Chronicles of Narnia*, but he also published a book in 1960 titled *The Four Loves* which sought to explain, from a Christian perspective, the different forms love may take. A talented classicist, Lewis was influenced by Ancient Greek notions of love, a concept for which they had four words, each with a distinct meaning:

Type of love (Ancient Greek)	English equivalent	Meaning...
Storge	Affection	An affectionate love, borne of familiarity and commonly seen between family members.
Philia	Friendship	The love of friendship; a non-sexual, non-romantic yet powerful emotional bond between two people.
Eros	(Sexual or Romantic) Love	The love between partners in a romantic relationship; love with a sexual or erotic element.
Agape	Charity	An unconditional love, peculiar to Christianity in Lewis's thought.

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Lewis considered agape (or charity) to be the highest form of love, and the sense of what is meant when the Bible says: 'Whoever does not love does not know God, but who does not know God does not see him' (1 John 4:8). Agape then is the love of God, which, since we are not divine, we can never sense approximate. It is a love that is 'wholly disinterested and desires what is sinless' (Lewis, *Loves*, p. 177). It is a love not just for what attracts us, or to those who we consider 'grateful' or 'deserving'. It is a love for all, even those who are not naturally lovable; lepers, criminals, enemies, morons, the sulky, the superior and the inferior (Lewis, *Loves*, p. 177).

The Four Working Principles

Fletcher developed four presuppositions which are central to his discussion of situational ethics.

These presuppositions are the key assumptions Fletcher will make about the nature of morality which he will use to derive his entire system of ethics. They all have a **situationist** groundwork for a **teleological** theory.

	Fletcher's four presuppositions	Explanation
1.	Pragmatism	Moral demands should be practical and achieve the intention which is love.
2.	Relativism	All situations should be assessed on how best to demonstrate love through following moral laws which use the words 'never' and 'always'.
3.	Positivism	Being able to say that 'God is love' on the basis of faith, experience. The moral agent has to decide, through the use of reason, the most important thing of all. ⁴
4.	Personalism	Demands that the needs and importance of people are taken into account over the demands of moral law.

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⁴ Vardy, C and Vardy P, *Ethics Matters* (London: SCM Press, 2012), p. 126.

The Six Propositions

From the four working principles, Fletcher derives his six fundamental principles which can be understood and applied in ethical situations.

	Fundamental Principle	Explanation
1.	'Only one thing is intrinsically good; namely love: nothing else at all'	The only intrinsically good things – the good things in themselves – are love and love's instrumentally good.
2.	'The ruling norm of Christian decision is love, not something else'	The Jewish laws have been replaced by love to one's neighbour. It is not moral to follow the law.
3.	'Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed, nothing else'	Love and justice are the same thing but justice is how we give others what they are owed, and what they deserve. Justice helps us to decide how to distribute love among different people.
4.	'Love wills the neighbour's good, whether we like him or not'	Love should be shown regardless of whether we like a person or not. It is not about developing love in the personal sense. It is about having the right attitude towards others.
5.	'Only the end justifies the means, nothing else'	If love is the outcome of one's actions, then the means taken to achieve this are not morally important. The outcome that matters.
6.	'Love's decisions are made situationally, not prescriptively'	Decisions must be made then and there, and the specific factors can be taken into account. Laws are made on the basis of laws that prescribe.

Discussion Activity:

In groups, try to think of a few dilemmas in which situation ethics might allow a different decision to the one that would be made by keeping with the traditional teachings than the teaching of Aquinas.

Case Study Examples

Fletcher draws on many examples in his writing, both from real life and fiction, to show how the following common moral rules would not result in the most loving outcome. He also shows how sometimes principles have to be abandoned in order to do the most loving thing.

1. A woman who kills her crying baby in order to protect a group of people from being attacked by Native Americans on the Wilderness trail in the USA during the early settlements
2. A military nurse who treated her patients harshly so they would have extra motivation to get better and be discharged
3. A woman who committed adultery with a Russian prison camp guard so she would become pregnant and be able to return to her family
4. A doctor who allows an abortion for a woman in a mental hospital who has been raped
5. Someone who kills a man in order to prevent a long drawn-out blood feud between two families that would result in more deaths

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Conscience

For Fletcher, the conscience, in the everyday sense of the word, simply does not exist. It is a head in the clouds which, whether through divine intervention or a mysterious notion of moral truth, tells us what is right or wrong in a given situation is no more than a fiction.

All we have is our ability to work out the correct thing to do in a given situation. Like any ability, it is sometimes exercised well and sometimes exercised badly. As Fletcher puts it, 'Situation ethics is interested in conscience as a function, not as a fact. It takes conscience into account only when it is useful in deciding.' (*Situation Ethics*, 1963, p. 53). **Conscience** then, should be seen as a very practical activity, rather than a mystical one, which involves the individual making decisions created by the situation.

Issues

Does situation ethics provide a helpful method of moral decision-making?

One of the main difficulties with situation ethics is an issue which plagues all teleological theories: how can we predict the end result of one's actions. Therefore, even if one does try to determine the result because of the inherent unpredictability and complexities of human situations, Fletcher and Peter Vardy argue that situation ethics' 'lack of clear guidance' means that the theory is so permissive that almost any kind of action could be justified.

Fletcher considered the flexibility of his theory to be a great strength, but he also acknowledged that our more severe moral duties ('Do not kill', etc.) was not a decision to be taken lightly. He argued that the only actions that would need to do what would otherwise be indecent are few and far between. He also acknowledged that sometimes the rules do need to be broken, in order for the right thing to be done. In contrast to legalistic alternatives, he would claim his theory is infinitely preferable.

Should we always judge something to be good because *agape* is best served?

We may wonder whether the Christian notion of *agape* really has any relevance in a secular society. Fletcher was known to emphasise Christian teaching, and in doing so, attracted a few fellow believers. Nevertheless, a critic might argue that he set himself an impossible task: to translate the Christian notion of love in a secular society, and it certainly should have no place in a secular society. This would certainly be the view of some utilitarians.

In Fletcher's defence, we might point out that one does not have to be a Christian to accept a teaching such as 'Love thy neighbour as thyself'. Indeed, Fletcher's construal of the Christian notion of love (see below) is so close to ideas of utility and the 'common good' as to be almost indistinguishable. The basis of his theory is not necessarily a reason to discard it entirely, although we might add that it is not really adds.

Is Fletcher's understanding of *agape* really a religious idea at all?

Messer writes that Fletcher's situation ethics is 'essentially a version of act-utilitarianism'⁵ and, when you come to study the latter theory in detail (Section 2.1), the parallels will be clear: both are teleological, relativist theories which admit of no absolute laws and require us to put the interests of the many above those of the few. It is only Fletcher's emphasis on *agape* as the ultimate good, rather than utility (or pleasure) which separates them. However, Messer concludes that 'it seems fairly clear [Fletcher's theory] less lifts a secular philosophical theory off the shelf in order to speak of what might be understood by Christian love. This, not surprisingly, leaves large gaps in his understanding both of love and of the human good.'⁶

⁵ Messer, N, *SCM Study Guide: Christian Ethics*, (London: SCM, 2006), p. 81

⁶ Ibid. p. 82

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The charge is that Fletcher has simply taken agape to mean 'do whatever is best in a given situation' which, for all intents and purposes, amounts to little more than the utilitarian principle (i.e. 'what creates the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people'). This not only repeats the objections usually levelled at act utilitarianism (see Section 2B – Issues), but also suggests that situation ethics is not, strictly speaking, a religious idea at all.

Messer writes that, for many theologians, a Christian ethical theory must be *distinctly Christian*. The teachings of Christ and the life story of Jesus must be what gives the theory its moral principles must be raised which are specific to Christianity (i.e. they would not be applicable to non-Christians). If Fletcher's notion of agape is really just a secular idea of utility, then we cannot say his theory is Christian. Likewise, if the moral standards generated by situation ethics are identical to those of a secular liberal democracy, then we cannot say his theory is Christian.

Charlotte and Peter Vardy concur, arguing that situation ethics 'confuses the concept of agape' described in the Bible because 'Christian love always sees love at the centre of a person's life and love of God as being primary and Fletcher plays the latter down in the interest of making his theory as widely acceptable as possible'. Therefore, the importance of loving God, the first of Jesus's two main commands, is ignored by Fletcher because he was trying to appeal to an increasingly secular audience (see Mark 12:28–31, Luke 10:27).

Does rejecting absolute rules make morality individualistic and subjective?

Situation ethics has received a negative reception from the Catholic Church. In 1950 it criticised it, and in 1956 the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office banned it from Catholic teaching and learning.⁷ It was argued that, although the conscience could be a source of moral knowledge, situation ethics treated conscience as the source of moral knowledge. Moral knowledge should be **natural moral law** which is objective and absolute.

... the Church throughout her history has always considered a certain number of principles as having an absolute and immutable [unchanging] value, and in the contradiction of them the teaching and spirit of the Gospel

(Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics, 1968)

Charlotte and Peter Vardy contend that an individual could claim they acted situationally but have been motivated by 'baser motives'. This might not even be done deliberately. We can see things from our own subjective point of view, whereby bias can creep in. The theory is open to abuse because it is 'used to justify doing what people feel inclined to do'.

Written Activity 2: Fletcher's Situation Ethics

1. What is 'agape'?
2. Give a Bible quote about Jesus's teaching regarding love.
3. Fletcher believed situation ethics provided a middle ground between which two ethical theories?
4. List Fletcher's four presuppositions.
5. What did Fletcher mean when he said only love is intrinsically good?
6. What did Fletcher think of the conscience?

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⁷ Vardy, C and Vardy P, *Ethics Matters* (London; SCM Press, 2012), p. 130

SECTION 2: NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY DEONTOLOGY AND TELEOLOGY

In the second section of the course, we will consider two schools of ethical thought and their ideas about the nature of morality: **deontology** and **teleology**.

We begin with the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant's deontological, absolute, approach. He holds morality consists of certain absolute duties which hold across time and place. Kant's more speculative ideas of freedom, immortality and God. Afterwards, we look at the utilitarian, or teleological, account focuses on the consequences of actions, and holds that what is pleasurable is good.

2A: KANTIAN ETHICS

Key Thinker	
Name	Immanuel Kant
Born	1724
Died	1804
Key texts	<i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> (1781), <i>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals</i> (1785)
Why are they important?	Such is Kant's significance, it has sometimes been said that philosophy began with him. Central to his philosophy is the idea that human capacity for reason could be used to make the world a better place. This was the hallmark of the European Enlightenment, a period when people were increasingly turning to their own rationality, rather than religious authority, to solve pressing problems of the day. Kant was, by all accounts, a rationalist. He put God out of his philosophical work. Indeed, much of Kant's time was spent on what we could know through speculative thought alone. In his ethics, he was adamant that we only need reflect carefully to determine what is right. Kant was reputed to enjoy telling and hearing jokes after eating, but he was, however, not born out of a love for banter; he simply believed that it was a duty to be cheerful.
Did you know?	

Duty

For Kant, reason governs morality. Knowing what is right or wrong to do in a given situation is a little bit like solving a sum: there is only one correct answer, and we simply need to apply the right method to find it. Doing the right thing is our *duty* as rational beings. If we do the wrong thing then we are not just acting immorally, we are acting irrationally. Kantian ethics is **deontological** and **absolutist**: it is concerned with universal rules that apply at all times, to all people, in all places.

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Origins of the Concept of Duty

Kant was deeply immersed in the intellectual life of his age. Pojman argues that his influences:

- (i) **Pietism:** A sect of the Lutheran Church which 'emphasized honesty, deep feeling, and a devotion to duty rather than theological doctrine or orthodox belief'. Kant was brought up as a Pietist, which shaped his belief that the good will is the 'sole intrinsic good in life' (Pojman).
- (ii) **Rousseau:** French political philosopher who influenced Kant's ideas about the autonomy (a hallmark of Enlightenment era thought)
- (iii) **Rationalism and Empiricism:** Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophical debate between those who thought knowledge could largely be attained *a priori* (empiricists), and those who believed instead that much of our knowledge was derived from reason (rationalists). Kant's overall position was complex (look up the transcendentalist as a challenge), but he was distinctly rationalist when it came to ethics: morality is derived purely through reason (this is in marked contrast to the utilitarians – studied in the next chapter). Intellectual heirs to the seventeenth-century Anglo-Irish empiricists).
- (iv) **Natural Law:** Like Aquinas, Kant believed that the human capacity for reason enables us to derive moral rules. However, he differed from Aquinas in viewing certain religious, rather than moral duties. For instance, duties such as 'to worship God' are religious duties, while a duty based on the precept 'to preserve life' is a moral duty.

Kant's particular understanding of duty turns on his distinction between *hypothetical* and *categorical imperatives*, which we turn to now.

Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives

First, some terminology: *imperatives* are just commands – instructions which tell us what to do.

Hypothetical imperatives usually look like this: 'You ought to do x if you want to achieve y'. They command us to do something *if* we want something else. They are *conditional*. The word *hypothetical* is used to refer to a situation that *could* happen, usually if certain conditions are met. 'If NASA develop the right technology, hypothetically, human beings could live on Mars'.

Categorical imperatives are usually of the form 'You ought to do x'. They command us to *just do it*. They are *unconditional* commands. The word *categorical* means something *absolute*. Politicians or prominent public figures often issue 'categorical statements' to distance themselves from a scandal in the newspapers; they mean to say that they are not involved with it.

It is the difference between bargaining with a trader at a car-boot sale and being barked at by an army major. 'I'll give you £3 if you throw away this old CD' can be transformed into a hypothetical imperative, 'You ought to give me another CD if you want to get £3', whereas 'Stab! Stab! This is a kill!' can be translated into the categorical imperative 'You ought to stab, you ought to twist, you ought to kill'.

Why is the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives so crucial for Kant? Because he thinks that one can only do something good if it is done *unconditionally*, or, to put it another way, with no strings attached. As a result, it is our *duty* to do good. Analogously, it is a soldier's duty to protect the nation – even if they wake up one morning and do not feel much like fighting or marching, still they must do it.

Summary
Pojman
and
(See
next
chapter)

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In the first chapter of his most significant ethical work, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant writes:

'Nothing in the world – or out of it! – can possibly be conceived that could have a qualification except a GOOD WILL... It isn't what it brings about, its use or its consequences that make it good – i.e. its intended end. Rather, good will is good because of how it wills – i.e. it is good in itself.'

He goes on to say that all other things which are generally considered to be good – riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being, contentment with one's lot, happiness, inspire pride... if there is not a good will to direct the influence of the good things. Kant argues, are not good in themselves because they can be bad if misused. Power, for the general good, or it might be used tyrannically. Such things, Kant argues, are only good when paired with a good will. A good will is said to 'sparkle like a jewel all by itself'; its value is independent of its use, for or fruitless it [is]. It is 'the condition of all [other goods and happiness]'; it is 'the only thing in the world that is good without qualification'. We should live in accordance with **reason**. It just doesn't make sense to say that something is good because rationality requires a good that is absolute – whereas, any other thing we value in some circumstances, turn out to be bad. From this standpoint, Kant derives his ethical theory of deontological ethics.

The Three Formulations of the Categorical Imperative

First Formulation: The Law of Nature

'Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.'

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Chapter 2

The first formulation is known as the formula of the Law of Nature because it refers to laws which apply to everybody) of morality must be kept in mind when making moral decisions. A particular procedure for making moral decisions which is sometimes known as the 'maxim test'.

The core idea is that when we make any moral decision we must ask ourselves whether the same thing is sensible in all circumstances. In Kant's language, we are making a maxim. A maxim could become a universal law (a maxim is another word for a general rule or principle). For example, '30 mph in the school centre', 'Don't run in the corridor'.

For some actions, this is clearly impossible. If I like the look of your new mobile phone, I might be quite like to steal it, Kant would immediately ask that I stop and consider the following question: 'Can I honestly recommend the maxim that in any circumstance where somebody feels like it, they should steal ahead and do it?'

Now, I might well turn round and say 'Get lost Kant! I'll take what I like, when I like it, and I don't care what you say but this simply would not work. If everyone were permitted to steal when they feel like it, all private property would soon disappear. In fact, people would probably not bother with their property going to be stolen, so pretty soon there would be nothing to steal. In other words, 'steal whenever you feel like it' is self-defeating.

On the other hand, a maxim such as 'It is not permissible to torture small children' is not self-defeating. If nobody ever tortures small children, no problems are likely to arise. Certainly the maxim is not self-defeating about that rule. The opposite, however ('It is permissible to torture small children') would defeat itself.

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Perfect and Imperfect Duties

In the *Groundwork*, Kant divides duties into perfect and imperfect categories. Perfect duties such as 'Do not kill', 'Do not steal' – their universalisation involves an obvious logical contradiction.

Imperfect duties relate to those maxims which do not involve any logical contradiction, but are undesirable for a rational being. For instance, there is no logical contradiction in the maxim 'When in need, feel free to urinate on tom's grave'. Society would not collapse if everyone did this; the cemetery whenever they needed a bathroom. It is hard to imagine anyone in a world where everyone is allowed to defile the graves of each other's ancestors, however, we have an imperfect duty to 'not act disrespectfully towards the dead'.

Discussion Activity:

In groups, discuss whether the following activities could be universalised without contradiction.

- stealing bread to feed starving children
- queuing for the cash machine
- maintaining a heroin addiction
- having a roast lunch every Sunday
- vandalising urinals
- supporting Manchester United
- working as a doctor
- lying about your age and appearance on an online dating site

Second Formulation: The End in Itself

'So act as to treat humanity, both in your own person, and in the person of every other, always as an end, never simply as a means.'

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Chapter 2

There is also another reason that Kant would have a big problem with torturing someone (or anybody), and it is this aspect of his philosophy, the so-called 'humanity formula', which has had an enduring influence on Western thought. Kant maintains that no good can ever come from using people as a means to an end. Torturing an innocent man to stop a twisted sadist from setting off a bomb in Piccadilly Circus can never be justified for Kant, because somebody is being *used* as a means to an end. There is an intuitive appeal to this idea: how often have we seen in a melodrama a villain say 'I'll use you, me!' uttered with absolute disgust? There is something deeply unsettling about being used by someone with or to you, not because they like you, or value you, or even love you, but for a purely malevolent purpose.

Kant recognised this, and thought he could explain *why* people feel this way. People feel this way because they are rational beings, and rational beings deserve dignity, they deserve to be treated *always* as ends in themselves.

Discussion Activity:

In groups, discuss whether humanity (the agent) is being used as a means or an end.

- i) A boy scout helps a frail old lady across the road to earn his 'Assisting the Elderly' badge.
- ii) A student steals his friend's assignment so that he can copy his work.
- iii) On the way home from the pub, Matt gives a homeless man £1.33.
- iv) Belinda compliments her line manager's terrible outfits and laughs at his boss who wants to be promoted.
- v) A woman steals bread from the supermarket to feed her starving family.
- vi) Orhan is with Lucia to make his ex-girlfriend jealous.
- vii) Steve buys everyone in the office a Milky Bar from the corner shop.

Third Formulation: The Kingdom of Ends

'Act according to the maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends, as if it were a real one.'

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Chapter 2

For his final formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant envisions a utopian kingdom of ends where all rational beings share the same moral vision, desiring the same goods and sharing the same ends. He formulates this as the laws the hypothetical members of the kingdom would devise for themselves, as the laws of 'Nature' and 'humanity' formulae. Hence, any moral rules constructed must be consistent with these laws, and not lead to contradiction and treat people as ends, never means. Kant's third formulation adds a practical dimension to his theory: he is trying to tell us how society would be governed if all people were to follow the categorical imperative. When acting individually, we should 'act as if we were legislating for a kingdom of ends', in the hope that by doing so, we might bring it closer to reality.


The Three Postulates

Kant argues that in order for his ethical theory to work, we must make certain assumptions about the world. These assumptions are called *postulates*: they are things we need to accept as true for our theory to take place. If one evening I find myself debating whether to order mushrooms on my pizza, I may have postulated that somewhere is willing to deliver. Postulates are not something we assume in order for our reasoning to make sense. I do not need to assume that the pizza shop was open to start thinking about the toppings I want, but I do need to assume that the pizza shop is open for the pizza to be worthwhile.

There are three such postulates that Kant believes are necessary for his account of morality to work.

Freedom

Kant argued that in order for morality to exist, we must assume that humans have *free will*. When faced with an action or decision, Kant thinks, the agent must really have a choice. Otherwise, they cannot really be said to have been responsible for their action. Hence, freedom is sometimes understood as the *ability to have done otherwise*. If we could not have done otherwise, then we cannot be said to have been free. Instead, our actions would have been *determined* by some prior cause.



Unfortunate

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Kant held that morality requires **autonomy**: if we are to act morally, we must be able to *choose for ourselves* what to do. We can't be said to have acted autonomously if someone has forced us to behave that way (this is the opposite of autonomy, **heteronomy**). To be *autonomous* is to be *responsible* for one's actions; they must arise out of one's own decision. With a gun to the head, we do what we are told – the only other option is death. In such a case, if an individual acts *heteronomously*, the responsibility for what ever happens lies with whoever is holding the gun.

Autonomy
chosen
be auto

Heteronomy
an outside
heteron

Research



1. Read the passage below. What is the author's view of freedom?

'Let us imagine a man who, while standing on the street, would say to himself at evening, the work day is over. Now I can go for a walk, or I can go to the clock tower to see the sun set; I can go to the theater; I can visit this friend or that out of the gate, into the wide world, and never return. All of this is strictly complete freedom. But still I shall do none of these things now, but with just a little delay to my wife.'

Schopenhauer, *On the Freedom of the Will*, Chapter III

2. Kant's views on freedom form part of a much larger debate in philosophy about free will. Kant attacked both **hard determinism** and **compatibilism**, famously calling the latter 'subterfuge'. Look up both of these terms.

Immortality

The ultimate aim of the moral being, in Kant's philosophy, is to achieve moral perfection as a consequence of our rational nature and the kind of moral laws it prescribes. However, we can't. It is clear that we cannot achieve moral perfection in this life, but if we *ought* to achieve it, it is *possible* that it is achievable. Hence, Kant postulates immortality as a solution. Our duty to achieve moral perfection Kant believes is the intrinsic aim of our rational nature.



God

One criticism which has been levelled at Kantian ethics is that it demands too much. If we are to act morally, we must follow the moral law, even if it means that we must rule out acting morally for one's own benefit, in fact, he thinks morality should be followed for its own sake. Even if doing the right thing is not what is best for you, Kant still thinks you should do it. It is a lot to ask but, says Kant, it is all for the greater good, in fact, it is for the **Summum Bonum**. Doing what is right, even if it does not feel like it at the time, is the greatest possible good, it should also eventually lead to happiness. Happiness is not, after all, a *bad* thing, it's just that alone, it does not provide enough. The problem, however, is that often doing the right thing doesn't bring happiness. Theft, corruption, greed and treating people as means rather than ends being rich might make you very happy. Honesty, loyalty and putting your own interests aside might very well leave you worse off. Particularly when others do not share your scruples. Yet the **Summum Bonum** must exist, otherwise it would not make sense to direct our actions toward it. So, Kant thinks, the best way to resolve the problem is to *postulate* the existence of God to ensure the universe is ultimately fair.



Summum
Bonum
the highest
good

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Written Activity 3: Kantian Ethics

1. What is meant by deontology?
2. Give an example of a hypothetical imperative.
3. What is a maxim?
4. Give an example of a categorical imperative.
5. The formula of the Law of Nature requires that maxims are able to be universalised. What does this mean?
6. State the second formulation of the categorical imperative.
7. Name Kant's three formulations.

Issues**Does Kantian ethics provide a helpful method of moral decision-making?**

This criticism is most often levelled at Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative (**Law of Nature**), which, due to its highly formal and abstract nature, may be charged with not being what a moral theory should be. Pojman lists several examples of actions, ranging from trivial to downright fiendish, which seem to pass the universalisability test. Remember, the test is:

Only act on those maxims which can be universalised without contradiction.

Pojman points out that this could be used to universalise completely trivial actions. He holds that any maxim which passes this procedure becomes a binding **duty** which must be followed. For instance, a maxim such as 'I should always add sugar before milk to my tea' can be universalised without contradiction (society would not collapse if everyone did this), yet it seems ridiculous to do this.

The counter-argument is that such maxims simply show the action is permissible (adding sugar before sugar) does not result in contradiction either. Therefore, we are free to maximise our pleasure and not have any moral obligations.

More troubling are cases where outright horrible actions are universalisable. For instance, a maxim such as 'I should kill anyone who wears cardigans' is logically universalisable because no contradiction would result in my killing all cardigan wearers. Topshop may suffer a loss in revenue, but there is no risk of society imploding under the weight of irrationality.

Obviously, such maxims are forbidden by the other two of Kant's formulations, and it seems a bit unfair to pick any one aspect out. Equally, however, we might argue that if any one aspect is redundant, then it shouldn't be part of the theory. That too is unfair. As Pojman writes, 'the... universalisability test, constitutes a necessary condition for being a valid moral principle, but it does not provide us with a sufficiency criterion.'⁸ So the first formulation tells us what a good moral principle should look like, but it doesn't give us any of the real content.

Now, we might still argue that this is all too complicated to be of any use in day-to-day moral decision-making. That's a valid point, but it is not specific to Kantian ethics. Indeed, it is a criticism levelled at all act-based theories, chiefly by people who believe we should talk about good people, rather than good actions (these are known as virtue ethicists).


⁸ Pojman, J, *Discovering Right and Wrong*, (Stamford: Wadsworth, 2012), p. 134

A slightly different version of this criticism is that Kantian ethics is helpful for some things but not for all. Generally speaking, we might say it is good for case-by-case individual decisions and autonomy. It produces good rules to abide by when trying to tackle human rights and justice. However, when decisions need to be made which will affect large groups of people, rights and duties may conflict, and since both are absolute, it is difficult to reach a resolution. Below, tries to show how Kant can still be of use when it comes to far-reaching ethical decisions.

Should we always judge something as good her and why is best served?

Imagine that one night you are woken up in the middle of the night by the sound of loud banging at the door. You answer, stood before you is a man whose face is covered by a hockey mask. He doesn't know the exact whereabouts of a woman who you are spending the night at a hotel down the road. You even know her room number.

Now the sensible thing to do in this situation, if you could get your wits about you, would be to lie; to tell the murderer that you have never heard of this woman or even give him a false address. The one thing that would seem to be a terrible idea in this scenario would be to tell the truth: 'Of course, she is staying at the Crystal Lake Inn, Room 73A.' Yet for Kant, this would be the correct course of action because the maxim, 'Lie when it suits you to do so', cannot be universalised (if everyone lied whenever they felt like it, people would quickly stop believing anything anyone said).



A scenario similar to this was presented to Kant in his own time by one of the (many) philosophers who followed him. It has come to be known as 'The Case of the Inquiring Murderer'. Kant's own response was considered unsatisfactory. He suggests that in this scenario we should still tell the truth, but he also considers the consequences of not doing so. It is possible, Kant thinks, that lying about the woman's whereabouts might inadvertently send the murderer to their next hiding place. It is best then, in circumstances like this, to follow the absolute rule because we cannot account for disobeying it.

James Rachels, in *The Elements of Moral Philosophy* points out two problems with Kant's approach.

- (i) Firstly, Rachels asks, 'Is the case that our predictive powers are so limited? Determining the consequences of our actions is arguably essential to a functional society. Supermarkets stockpile burger buns and disposable cutlery in the summertime because they are more likely to be needed than in January. Likewise, there will be more police on duty on Saturday night than on a Tuesday afternoon because the police are able to deal with the trouble from wayward drinkers at the weekend, when the clubs are open late. If we follow Kant's rule, clubs are shut and the clubbers working.'
- (ii) Secondly, Rachels points out that 'Kant seems to assume that although we are responsible for any bad consequences of lying, we would not be similarly responsible for any bad consequences of telling the truth' (p. 125). The issue here is that Kant is having his cake and eating it too. On the one hand, he is morally responsible for the consequences of breaking absolute rules (e.g. lying), on the other he does not want us to be morally responsible for the consequences of telling the truth (e.g. by telling the truth, we have arguably helped the murderer in finding his next hiding place). Kant cannot have it both ways.

The obvious solution to Kant's dilemma would be to make the maxims we act on more specific. Instead of 'You ought never to lie', why not say, 'You ought never to lie to a person's life.' There is surely nothing self-defeating about that maxim, and it would be a good rule to live by. Kant's 'Case of the Inquiring Murderer' at a stroke.

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The only trouble with this response is that it is unclear where we draw the line. It may become possible to make maxims so specific that any kind of action becomes permissible. Say my friend – call him Tom – wants to borrow some money for a new PlayStation but has no intention of ever paying it back. The maxim ‘Take out a loan if you want it but don’t pay it back’ cannot pass the universalisation test because it is self-defeating; if nobody paid loans back, nobody would give out loans in the first place. However, the maxim ‘You ought to always repay loans unless your name is Tom Reed and you need a new PlayStation’ refers to such a specific set of circumstances that it is unlikely to result in a universalised law. Yet we are unlikely to agree we have, thereby, made Tom’s action

Kant likely found flaws with this kind of reasoning. Crucial to his deontological consistency is that morality is to be binding, it must apply to all people equally. We can agree that one but not the other. As Rachels puts it, ‘If you accept any considerations as reasons, you must accept them as reasons in other cases.’ Tom’s reason for allowing himself to borrow money and not repay may be something like, ‘Oh man, I really need that new PlayStation or every tyre!’ However, if the shoe was on the other foot and it was Tom who was giving a loan, would he be willing to accept somebody else’s desire for a video games console and fear of being laughed at as reasons never to pay him back? It’s highly unlikely. One of the strengths of Kant’s philosophy is that it is not ‘special’ or has interests which are of greater significance than anyone else’s.

Is Kantian ethics too abstract to be applied to practical moral decision-making?

We have already seen a version of this criticism in ‘The Case of the Inquiring Murderer’. One point one might make is that this shows Kant’s entire ethical system is suspect when applied to practical decision-making. The charge would be that Kant misses the moral woods for the trees, treating ethics as an abstract, philosophical problem, rather than an issue with messy human lives.

The contemporary Kantian ethicist Onora O’Neill, in her paper ‘Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems’, attempts to show that this charge is unfounded. O’Neill concentrates on the second categorical imperative (the ‘humanity formula’) and considers how it might be applied in a situation of scarcity, such as a famine. Firstly, however, she points out that when Kant says ‘Do not treat others as mere means to an end’, the *mere* means to an end means to involve them in a scheme of action to which they could not in principle consent. That there is anything wrong about someone as a means. Evidently we have to do with the consent of action.⁹

That is an important point because it rules out some of the more frivolous objections to Kantian ethics. If we can never treat others as a means to an end, does that mean we can’t hire a plumber to fix a sink unblocked, or a doctor as a means to getting an appendix removed? That would be absurd, and, O’Neill argues, it is not what Kant is getting at. What Kant is really trying to prohibit is treating people as mere means without their *consent*: namely, that we shouldn’t do things to people which they would never consent to (at least at the time) going to be happy to consent to being used as a means to getting the problem fixed. If they will be paid for it.

What we cannot do is treat people as mere means to our own ends, treating them *entirely* as a tool to be used to exact our whims. Usually, this will involve either deception or coercion. For instance, lying to the public (or any person under your employ) that you will pay them, when in fact you do not plan to, purely so that they do the work, would be to use them as a mere means to an end. Likewise, forcing someone to work for you on pain of death (slavery) would be immoral.

Suggested Reading
O’Neill, O, ‘Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems’ in ed. Shafer-Landau, R, *Practical Ethics*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013)
Landau, R, ed. *Practical Ethics*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013)

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⁹ O’Neill, O, ‘Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems’ in ed. Shafer-Landau, R, *Practical Ethics*, (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013)

With the humanity formula unpacked, O'Neill proceeds to speculate about what kind of duties it would entail in a famine. She begins by specifying two clear principles one should abide by if one is living under famine conditions:

- (i) If rationing is in place, one should not cheat to get more than one's fair share, e.g. by establishing a black market.
- (ii) One must meet the obligation of dependents, e.g. the elderly, the young and the infirm. Although in conditions of extreme scarcity this may be impossible, one should not simply sacrifice the weak to increase the welfare of the rest.

O'Neill also argues that duties towards those living in more affluent societies have to do with the most unfortunate. She argues that Kantian ethics specifies duties of beneficence which 'develop or promote others' ends and that, in particular, foster others' capacities to pursue ends, to be autonomous beings'. We should then feel more duty-bound to be beneficent to those in 'parts of the world where extreme poverty and hunger leave people unable to pursue any of their other ends' than to those 'who are already in a position to pursue varieties of ends.'¹⁰ The argument here essentially seems to be that duties should be directed to the *most* unfortunate (i.e. those least able to pursue their own ends).

We might still question whether O'Neill has been specific enough in her recommendations. Even if we even say that, for all the philosophical wrangling, we have been left with some fairly clear commands ('Don't cheat others', 'Don't force people to do things they don't want to do'), the claim that it is at least *possible* to apply Kantian ethics to a real-world problem, then it seems that the claim that it is *practical* (to be practical') is false. Nevertheless, one can still say that even if it is a somewhat idealistic approach, the *most* practical approach, and, more importantly, that it is the best because something is good because something makes it good.

Does Kantian ethics rely too much on reason?

Another common criticism of Kant's ethics is his insistence on a dispassionate approach to morality. Something is good about all good having to be done as it is what reason dictates, not because of the goodness it brings to one's heart.

Take this case: after Remi comes home from work he surprises his bedridden girlfriend Simone with some hot chicken soup and a bouquet of flowers. When she says, 'Oh you sweetie!' he responds, 'I am merely following the dictates of reason; it is my duty to assist close relations when they face ill health.' Simone may not be best pleased with Remi's rationale; she may say, 'What?! Don't you love me?' or 'Is that all you care about? Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative?!'

Now, Kant requires that for an action to be good the motive *must* be to do your duty. This means, strictly speaking, that if you act out of love for a significant other or family member then your action has no moral worth.

However, Kant can argue that he does not require us to feel *nothing* when we act. He only insists that our choice should not be based on *feeling* but on *reason*. Only then can we make a rational decision, and act in accordance with the categorical imperative. So we might help our family out of love *and* because it is our duty.

¹⁰ Ibid.

The twentieth-century British philosopher Bernard Williams made an influential contribution to moral philosophy. He asked us to imagine a situation where a man can save only one of two people from drowning. One of them is his wife, the other a complete stranger. He knows that whoever he chooses to save will be grateful. Of course, presuming the marriage is healthy, the man is going to choose to save his wife. This choice is not acceptable to Kant; a maxim stating that 'You ought to save your spouse from drowning' would fail the universalisability test.

Nevertheless, Williams points out that we have a peculiar arrangement where, as a result of the fact that the man must justify his action as follows: 'I love my wife so I will save her *and* the stranger.' This choice accords with the categorical imperative. The man has 'one thought too many'. It is not just a duty to be motivated by, but a duty to do good.

(Note that the same criticism also applies to utilitarian theories (Section 2B). Mill might say that we should save our spouses from drowning because, on the whole, marriages bring people more happiness than pain. However, for an action to be morally right do we need to do it because of a principle of utility?)

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2B: UTILITARIANISM

Utility

The Trolley Problem

My house is quite close to the train station, so I usually follow the track when I walk home from college. One day as I was passing I heard a lot of screaming from the distance. As I drew closer, I could see there were many people lined up like sardines on the rails. Just as I was about to step forward, it looked as though some villager had thrown them to the track! As soon as they spotted me they were desperately calling for help. 'How? How?!' I asked, gazing up at the twenty-foot barbed wire fence that stood between us. 'Look!' they said in unison, jerking their heads in the direction of a peculiar-looking pedestal a few paces to my left. 'There's a button on there! Press that button, it will switch the tracks and the trolley will go the other way!' I rushed over immediately, but just as I was about to push the button I saw on the other track, a small figure wrestling with his own bonds. 'Hey!' I shouted in my voice, 'Don't you know there's somebody else tied up on the other side?' 'Yes,' one of them said, 'but please, there are five of us and only one of him!' My finger hovered over the button in indecision.



'Quick!' they yelled, this time truly panicked, 'The train, oh God, the train!'

What would you do?

This thought experiment, known as *The Trolley Problem*, was devised by the moral philosopher Philippa Foot in the late 1960s (the trolley referred to in the problem is not the kind found outside Tesco or the kind found outside Tesco). It has been widely used by ethicists, philosophers and psychologists as a litmus test for moral instincts. The dilemma it poses goes right to the heart of what ethics is about: what is the right thing to do when there is no obvious right answer?

If you read *The Trolley Problem* and intuitively felt that you should switch the trolley to the other track at the expense of one, then chances are that you have utilitarian leanings. In fact, the theory itself found its most sustained treatment in the works of the nineteenth-century philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

Key Thinker	
Name	Jeremy Bentham
Born	1748
Died	1832
Key text	<i>An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation</i> (1789)
Why are they important?	Generally considered the founder of utilitarianism, Bentham became an influential theorist of utilitarian legal, penal and social reform.
Did you know?	Bentham, an atheist, donated his library to University College London, the first university in the country to do so at the time), asking that it first be open to all and then to be permanent. It is now known as the Bentham Project. It can still be seen today.

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
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A Teleological and Relativistic Theory

Bentham's ground-breaking *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* opens with the following words:

'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we are permitted to do.'



Crucially, Bentham is a **teleologist** – that being ruled by **pain and pleasure** means that humans are **not** free to make choice in the matter; we must avoid pain and go on to argue that basing our ethical decisions (what we should do) on anything else would simply be wrong.

Having made this claim about human nature (these are **claims** – they describe how things are), Bentham goes on to tell us how things ought to be.

This is the **principle of utility**, which states:

When faced with an ethical decision, we should choose the course of action which *maximises* pleasure and *minimises* pain for the *greatest number of people*.

The first important point to note is that Bentham is only concerned with the *consequences* of an action; the intention doesn't matter, and there is no regard for what might be considered our duty. This sets utilitarianism apart from both Aquinas and Kant, who both embrace **deontology**. In contrast, the utilitarian account is **teleological**: it is interested in *ends*, not *means*.

The second important point is that Bentham pays no mind to which *kinds* of actions produce pleasure. Whether the action is theft or charitable giving, taking a life or saving a life, if it produces more pleasure and less pain, that action is right. Like Fletcher, the utilitarians emphasise that what is right or wrong depends very much on the circumstances above. Normally we would say that putting somebody directly in the path of a moving train is wrong, but, due to the circumstances, it intuitively feels like the right course of action.

Act Utilitarianism and the Hedonic Calculus


Bentham was trained as a lawyer and had a keen interest in social and legal reform, so it is no surprise that he intended his system to have practical uses. To that end he devised what has come to be known as the **hedonic calculus**, a method for determining *quantitatively* (in terms of quantities, i.e. numbers) the right course of action (a hedonist is a person who seeks *pleasure* above all else; like many other terms, it comes from the Greek *hedone*, 'pleasure').

Bentham listed seven factors which must be taken into account when calculating the actual amount of pleasure an action will produce. They included 'intensity' (the strength of the pleasure), 'duration' (the length of the pleasure) and 'fecundity' (the likelihood one pleasure will lead to more pleasure). The **hedonic calculus** is a distinctive feature of Bentham's version of utilitarianism. Significantly, it maintains that ethical decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis; thus it is known as **act utilitarianism**.

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	Measure of Happiness	Definition
1	Intensity	how intense or weak the happiness is
2	Duration	how long the happiness will last for
3	Certainty	how likely or unlikely the happiness is to occur
4	Propinquity/Remoteness	how near or remote the happiness is
5	Fecundity/Richness	how likely or unlikely the happiness is to recur
6	Purity	how free from pain the happiness is
7	Extent	how far the happiness will reach




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Rule Utilitarianism

Key Thinker	
Name	John Stuart Mill
Born	1806
Died	1873
Key texts	<i>Utilitarianism</i> (1861), <i>On Liberty</i> (1859)
Why are they important?	Mill is today remembered primarily for his work in ethics (rule philosophy (liberalism)). However, he also made notable contributions to logic. With John White, Harriet Taylor Mill, he wrote one of the early texts of feminism, <i>The Subjection of Women</i> .
Did you know?	Mill's father, James Mill, was himself a utilitarian philosopher. He keen that his son be capable of carrying on his intellectual legacy. His childhood was devoted almost entirely to learning; he was studying at age 8, and by his mid-teens was well acquainted with the works of classical Greek poets, and also a number of Victorian economists. He suffered a mental breakdown in his early twenties, which he attributed to the rigorous educational regime he was subjected to by his father. He recovered with the help of Wordsworth's romantic poetry.



John Stuart Mill is generally considered the second great utilitarian philosopher. Like Bentham, he was committed to a teleological and relativistic account of morality, but he was critical of his predecessors' notion of a **hedonic calculus**.

Mill argued that happiness was much too complex and in every ethical situation. Therefore, he thought rules should be used to determine what will result in the common good.

He believed that rules should be developed through trial and error, rather than the hedonic calculus. For example, lying or hitting others nearly always causes unhappiness, therefore we could develop the rules 'Do not lie' and 'Do not hit'. Followed en masse by everyone in society, these rules will generate, on the whole, the most happiness and the least pain for the greatest number of people. The resulting theory has ever since been called **rule utilitarianism**.

Rule Utilitarianism
holds that the right action is the one which produces the greatest amount of happiness and the least pain.

Issues

Does utilitarianism provide a helpful method of moral decision-making?

In everyday speech, to describe something as utilitarian is essentially to say 'it gets the job done'. This is the essence of the philosophy, which prides itself on practicality and pragmatism. It is unlikely that utilitarian thinkers have been keen to get out of the study and to make the world a better place. Bentham was (as has already been mentioned) a legal reformer, Mill an MP, and Singer – the leading contemporary utilitarian – a prominent social and environmental activist. Given this, it would be a damaging accusation to suggest that utilitarianism is, in fact, an unhelpful method of moral decision-making.

Suggestive Point
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Such a claim is likely to draw on two fundamental criticisms of the utilitarian method.


- Utilitarianism does not adequately distinguish between acts or rules which create the greatest total happiness, and those which create the greatest average of happiness.
- Utilitarianism requires us to know what the consequences of our actions will be.

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Criticism (i) runs as follows: the **utility principle** tells us that the right action or rule is that which produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number'. Yet, as Pojman points out, on closer inspection, the requirements here – 'greatest happiness' and 'greatest number' – and, it may be argued, the utility principle itself. Imagine a utilitarian has to choose between two societies. Society A has 100 people, each with 10 units of happiness (we will come back to the question of whether happiness can be measured). Therefore, Society A has 1,000 total units of happiness, and an average happiness of 10 units per person. Society B has 1,000 people, each with five units of happiness. Therefore, Society B has 5,000 total units of happiness, but an average happiness of only five units. How does the utilitarian choose? Society A has a large share of happiness, but Society B is much larger, so there is a greater amount of happiness.



Likewise, are we better off creating vast, grossly unequal societies where some people have a lot of happiness, but most have very little, or smaller, more equal societies, where there is spread about more evenly? Objections of this form are not fatal for utilitarianism. The utility principle will require refinement if it is to be workable.

Negative Utilitarianism

One way of tackling the problem posed by (i) is to stop talking about pleasure, and to focus on reducing pain. This is known as negative utilitarianism. Essentially, negative utilitarianism is the hedonist's cousin. While the hedonist seeks to maximise pleasure, the negative utilitarian seeks only to reduce the amount of suffering in the world. In the words of the prominent contemporary negative utilitarian, this position '...attaches value in itself to the term only to actions which tend to minimise or eliminate suffering' (*The Hedonist's Dilemma*).


Moral perfection for the negative utilitarian is not everybody being happy, but nobody suffering. As Regan puts it: 'No amount of happiness or fun enjoyed by some organisms can notionally outweigh the horrors of Auschwitz. Nor can it outweigh the sporadic frightfulness of pain and suffering of every day.' (*Ibid.*) An odd consequence of adopting this view is that, even if the world were morally better, it would be better simply not to exist. If there is nothing to suffer, then the situation is as good as it can be.

Practically speaking, however, negative utilitarians do not seek to bring an end to all suffering. They seek to reduce suffering to a level that is acceptable. As a result, much hope is placed in technological advancement in areas such as medicine, engineering and pharmaceuticals to reduce suffering. Whether such potential can be translated into concrete change remains to be seen.

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We encountered a version of (ii) briefly in Section 1B: Situation Ethics. This is because it is a criticism of all **teleological** theories, not just utilitarianism. The argument goes that it is tremendously difficult, perhaps even impossible, to work out precisely what the consequences of a given action will be. Think back to *The Trolley Problem*: if you did decide to switch the tracks and sacrificed the one to save the five, how would you feel if one of those you saved was of an unstable temperament and a few years later, went on a murderous rampage in the local shopping precinct, killing over 50 people? You might say, 'Well, I could not possibly have known!' but that is exactly the point – teleological reasoning, the kind that requires us to do the impossible; it requires us to predict the future.



However, the teleologist (and, by extension, the utilitarian) will contend that this is not a good reason to reject the theory. Teleologists expect us to base our decision on only *our best guess* of what is going to happen. They do not expect absolute precision because life is simply too unpredictable. This is a reasonable expectation after all, much about human behaviour that can be predicted. Were a government serious enough, they would soon be able to predict where I would go after work on a Tuesday evening; if they had been listening in to my calls, they might even be able to predict what I would say. Even less extreme examples still hold water: the police send more officers to a particular area if they expect more people to be out and about, and to be more drunk than usual. It is not unreasonable to know that this might lead to trouble.

Nevertheless, even making an educated guess about the outcome of a particular action is a difficult task. It was Mill's view that, while Bentham had made a good start with his act utilitarianism, the complexity of the theory meant it was not particularly well suited to day-to-day moral decision-making. As discussed above, he believed that for the vast majority of ethical decisions, a rule-based convention could be appealed to; 'Thou shalt not steal', for instance. It is only when the situation is so complex that conventional, rule-based morality has no answers that Mill thought we should turn to utilitarianism. In such cases, we would presume a well-considered decision is required.

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Does Rule Utilitarianism Collapse into Act Utilitarianism?

One common criticism of rule utilitarianism is that in practice it ends up being no more than a pointlessly complicated version of act utilitarianism. Consider the following rule: 'Do not lie'. A rule utilitarian would likely agree that following this rule is likely to produce more happiness than following it. However, suppose there is a situation where lying would actually produce more happiness than telling the truth. For example, if a seven-year-old child were to ask one of their parents whether Santa Claus really existed, it would be better to reply, 'Of course! He comes over from the North Pole with a reindeer and presents!', than to crush their young heart with the like, 'No he does not. There is no magic or good in the world. Life is first toil, then death.'

The rule utilitarian may wish to change their rules in certain cases, which would be an exception in cases where it will preserve the innocence of youth', or, 'Don't lie except to protect national security.' However, pretty soon the distinction between rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism is going to become very blurred. If the morally correct *rule* which is decided on a case-by-case basis, how is this any different to deciding the morally correct action on a case basis?

The alternative for the rule utilitarian is to be far more inflexible. Even if following a rule will have terrible consequences, it should still be followed. This was termed by one of the rule utilitarians, J J C Smart, 'Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism', *The Philosophical Magazine*.

There are two responses a rule utilitarian can give to these charges; I shall let you decide which you are. Firstly, the rule utilitarian can argue that allowing too many exceptions to rules will undermine them. If people are likely to make exceptions to any given rule (such as 'Do not lie'), then they will not bother to obey them in the first place. Therefore, the rule utilitarian must, at the very least, ensure that the rules can be altered. Secondly, the rule utilitarian can state that there must be a safeguard rule in place which is able to prevent any catastrophic consequences. 'Break any of these rules before you do something outright barbarous.'

Should we judge something as good because utility is best served?

As we know by now, utilitarianism is a relativistic and teleological theory. It does not say that lying is wrong, only that what is good is whatever best serves utility. As a result, the ends justify the means. As Pojman has pointed out, what happens when it seems the ends are justified by the means, but the means are considered grossly immoral?

One such example is lying. Before you started studying ethics, you would probably have accepted as true, that lying is wrong. Yet a pure **act utilitarian** pays no mind to the morality of the lie. A lie needs to be told because it will produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, then it will be the correct course of action.

Consider the following scenario where utility is best served by deception, but we know something isn't right.

A depraved murderer is on the loose in a small town and the residents are increasingly panicked, if not hysterical. Local papers run with overblown headlines such as 'Police are Powerless to Stop Sick Killer', and fretful parents are pulling their children out of school. A pure act utilitarian in this situation may recommend imprisoning a harmless oddball for the murders, despite knowing full well that he had nothing to do with the killings. The worry is that the police had got their hands off the streets were safe to walk at night would no doubt bring great pleasure to the terrified townsfolk, and this pleasure is enough to far outweigh the pain felt by the harmless oddball who is being punished for a crime he did not commit.

Somehow, it seems plain wrong to punish people for crimes they have not committed, even if it benefits society. After all, what price is justice?

Nevertheless, the act utilitarian Bentham notoriously claimed that the idea of natural rights was nonsense. His thought was that, since something can only be called a right if it is respected as such, it is nonsense to talk about rights people have naturally, because the only way to have a right is for it to be respected (by an institution).

The practical consequences of this position are that human rights, as we may conceive them, are impossible. Instead, Bentham would have certain rights guaranteed by law because their existence would be in the utility.

Discussion Point:

'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.' (United States Declaration of Independence)

How does Bentham's view of rights contrast with the one presented in the quote?

The most troubling aspect of all this is those cases which would appear to all the world to be morally permissible according to Bentham's Principle of Utility.

A gang of four middle-aged sadists from Scunthorpe decide to capture a woman walking alone on the outskirts of the shopping precinct. The sadists gain immense pleasure from watching her suffer, which only ends when their victim's heart gives out. The woman they have captured is a socially awkward working girl, estranged from what little family she had and with no close friendships. She will not be missed. Although she suffered immensely through the ordeal, this pain shrinks in comparison to the sheer thrill felt by the four sadists, who consider their lives worth saving.

Even a committed act utilitarian would balk at the idea of the sadists' actions being justified. One reason cases like these seem to suggest is that weighing up the amount of pleasure produced and pain avoided is at best overly simplistic, and at worst downright misguided.

Mill's **rule utilitarianism** is better suited to the task of defending liberty and rights (his most famous work in this area is a philosophical defence of the liberal state). The idea is that a rule which prevents people from having their rights violated will produce more happiness for the whole, than a rule which does not. For instance, 'the right to not be falsely imprisoned' would produce more happiness than allowing people's rights to be ignored when it is convenient. (Note that this approach, discussed in the box-out above ('Does Rule Utilitarianism Collide with Act Utilitarianism?') and in detail by Pojman.¹¹)

¹¹ In particular, see pp. 106–107 and pp. 116–117.

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Government House Utilitarianism

One of the more controversial ideas that has been put forward by utilitarians is the 'Government House' theory of the Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick. According to him, where every person lives by the tenets of utilitarian morality may be neither possible nor desirable. Sidgwick proposes a two-tier system of morality where policymakers and other elites in society base their decisions purely on the principle of utility, while the vast majority of the population base their decisions on customary ethics that they always have. This is because the 'vulgar' masses may not understand the principle and so apply it incorrectly. If a greater happiness is more likely to be achieved by the population in the dark, then utilitarianism. So he is also advocating large-scale deception. The government, in order to maintain social order, lie to the populace.

Unsurprisingly, critics were quick to point out the elitism inherent in Sidgwick's utilitarian ethic for the 'enlightened few', Sidgwick reveals the prejudices of the time. It was thought the 'civilised' European powers knew what was best for their 'uncivilised' subjects. Sidgwick's position is more than a historical curiosity.

Is it even possible to measure goodness or pleasure?

An elephant has been standing in the room throughout this section. We have so far taken it for granted that the utilitarian's core claim – that we can have greater and lesser amounts of pleasure and pain – is a sound one. Yet how are we to measure them? Bentham proposed the **hedonic calculus**, but as a practical decision-making tool, it is undoubtedly flawed: when facing ethical dilemmas, we do not have time to whip out paper and pen in order to work out all the permutations. There is also a deeper worry about the nature of happiness in Bentham's thought. 'Pleasure is short,' he said, 'the most simplistic drinking game is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry.'¹² In Bentham, all pleasures were in a sense equal, it was only a matter of quantities.

Mill, on the other hand, had a very different take: he was much more concerned with quality. His thought was that there is something fundamentally more valuable about pleasures of the mind, such as literature and philosophy than bodily pleasures such as sex or drink. The significance of this is not just a case of *quantity*, it is a case of *quality* too. Happiness is, in Mill's view, a matter of quality.

Mill states the test for determining whether a pleasure is of a higher quality than another:

Pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all or almost all people who have experienced both have a decided preference to P1, irrespective of any feeling that they ought to prefer P1.

Group Activity:

In groups or as a class, make a list of the activities you find pleasurable. Then apply Mill's test to rank the higher pleasures, and which the lower?

However, we might ask: is it not a bit simplistic to suppose that people will always prefer the opera over a bucket of sex, and *Coronation Street*? Indeed, might it be the lower pleasures are easier to satisfy (in terms of both availability and effort) than the higher pleasures? For example, appreciating a dense work of high modernism such as James Joyce's *Ulysses* requires not only a significant investment of time but also considerable intellectual effort. Is it not far less effort and far quicker to just watch an Adam Sandler movie for a few hours?

¹² Bentham, Jeremy, *The Rationale of Reward* (1 ed.) (London: Robert Heward, 1830), p. 10.

It is often the case that those with the greatest sensibilities, intellectual refinement are likely to succumb to melancholy (as Mill himself did). Is it not in fact better to have most easily fulfilled? Why torture yourself for art or the intellect when you can be drunk and watching television?

In a famous passage, Mill responds to this objection by arguing that there is a distinction between *contentment*. Those who are better able to use the 'higher faculties', Mill claims, are still happier. This is because they know of a greater happiness which is *unavailable* only by the lower pleasures. Those who have access to both kinds of pleasure, know it is. They are the cat who does not go back to milk now it has tasted cream. *It would be a human being dissatisfied, and a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool or the pig. It is the same with us. It is because they know only their own side of the case.* (Ch. 2, p. 7)

Nevertheless, despite having a more refined account of pleasure, Mill was still, at heart, that the good consisted in no more than pleasure (even if it is 'higher pleasure'). The more pleasure there is, the more good also. To see why this might not be right, consider

Let me introduce myself, I am Professor Lethe and I have invented a most fabulous machine. This device, which I call Lethe's HedoneDome, is able, through some rather complex neuroscientific whatnots that I shan't go into, to grant its user the ability to experience a lifetime of unadulterated pleasure! Now, whether you wish to live the life of an emperor in Ancient Rome, or that of a libertine prince in an unseemly palace of carnal delights, or perhaps simply to while away your days serenely contemplating matters of the mind, I shall not judge – your choice of pleasure is yours and yours alone. When you enter, my device will erase every memory you ever had of this dreary, pain-begotten plane and let you live in the HedoneDome as if you had been born there! It is only pleasure, and knowing neither boredom nor satiation but instead to be able to can never be bored or satiated. The only catch – if it can be called that – is that you enter, you stay in the cave. Until the end of your days. All I need is a step...

Discussion Point:

Would you step inside Professor Lethe's Pleasure Cave? Why might this thought experiment be problematic for utilitarians?

This thought experiment was first devised by Robert Nozick in his 1974 work *Anarchy, State and Utopia* called devices such as the HedoneDome, 'Experience Machines'. His intention was to challenge the utilitarian's endorsement of **hedonism**. Nozick thought that people would *not* choose to live in a world of pure pleasure. He argued that people place some inherent value in *being connected* to the world. If people choose not to go into the machine this suggests they value something *other* than pleasure. This, Nozick argues, defeats hedonism, because it shows that not everything can be reduced to pleasure.

The contemporary Australian utilitarian, Peter Singer was aware of problems such as this. If he were talking about the maximisation of pleasure, he would talk about the maximisation of

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Peter Singer

Singer describes the thinking behind his **preference utilitarianism** as follows: ‘...my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. This requires me to weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of action most likely to be most beneficial to all those affected.... [This] way of thinking differs from classical utilitarianism in that it is concerned with the consequences of actions in terms of the satisfaction of preferences, rather than in terms of the amount of pleasure and pain they produce.’

A **preference** is something that we have an interest in pursuing. Sometimes, it might be the case that satisfying a preference does not bring somebody pleasure. For instance, satisfying our preference to stay in reality might not always bring us the most pleasure but it is our preference nonetheless. Perhaps this is why some people prefer sobriety; they know getting drunk might be fun, but ultimately, they think, it isn't *real*.

How does this relate to ethical decision-making? Well, the preference utilitarian right decision is the one which satisfies the greatest number of preferences.

An important point to raise here is that Singer did not think it was just human beings (those capable of feeling) have preferences too, even if it is just the preference to not be in pain. As a result, Singer strongly advocates a vegetarian or vegan lifestyle since, while it might satisfy the preferences of some human beings, it contradicts the preferences of many animals. One criticism that can be levelled at preference utilitarianism is that it could make it morally right to satisfy some downright dangerous desires. If my sole aim in life is to stick pins into my body, then according to a preference utilitarian it would be morally right to allow me to do so. Yet surely such a preference is evidence of an underlying mental illness, or at least a very bad way to live. The case is even stronger for those with severe depression who might have a preference for suicide. Examples like this raise the question of whether it is good to satisfy *all* preferences. In the latter, the preference utilitarian faces the difficult, if not impossible, task of deciding which preferences are *call good*.

Written Activity 4: Utilitarianism

1. What does 'utility' mean?
2. What does 'teleological' mean?
3. What statement summarises the utilitarian principle of utility?
4. Is act utilitarianism teleological or deontological? Define what these terms mean.
5. Name the seven measures of happiness in the hedonic calculus.
6. Define hedonism.
7. How is a higher pleasure to be distinguished from a lower pleasure?
8. Summarise preference utilitarianism in one sentence.

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¹³ Singer, P, *Practical Ethics* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 131-132.

Does Utilitarianism Require too Much of Us?

Peter Singer and Effective Altruism

All forms of utilitarianism ask us to take an objective, impersonal stance on matters of morality. The strict utilitarian, then, will not assign any more value to the happiness of the person they have never met who lives on the other side of the world than to the happiness of a person they have never met who lives on the other side of the street. The strength of this stance is that it means that assigning less significance to a person's pleasure or pain is not based on their hair colour, sexuality, social rank or any other aspect of their character is immediate. This also means that we must care not only about inflicting pain on our parents or partners but also about inflicting it on perfect strangers, family, friend, or foe, under the steely-eyed utilitarian gaze.

Pojman calls this the 'No-Rest Objection' to utilitarianism: the theory seems to require that we forego the requirements of personal relationships and refuse to do anything that would prevent us from having the greatest possible amount of happiness. Mill anticipated this objection when he wrote:

It is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as requiring that we should direct our minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The utilitarian is not intended for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals... the person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to [maximise happiness] in other words to be a public benefactor, are but exceptional
(Utilitarianism, Ch. 2)

His argument here is that the vast majority of humanity rarely has the opportunity to make ethical decisions. The ethical decisions that the average person makes will largely involve acquaintances; as such, most of the people affected by their moral decisions will have a personal relationship. It is only a few people in society, politicians and moral leaders, whose ethical decisions can have a widespread impact. The majority of us, Mill argues, are in a situation where we must choose between the demands of the utility principle and the demands of personal relationships. Conversely, some utilitarians like the view that we really do have far more ethical opportunities than we think we have. Most of us need to get our act together. They are represented by the Effective Altruism movement, a temporary group of utilitarians and utilitarian well-wishers who work on projects which use evidence and analysis to help others as much as possible, with the goal of creating 'a world where everyone is healthy, happy, fulfilled and free'. They take their cue from Peter Singer who forcefully argued the best-off are morally obliged to give up as much as possible for the benefit of the least well-off, until such point that giving would cause more harm than to not give:

'If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally, to do it.' (Famine, Affluence, and Morality)

SECTION 3: APPLIED ETHICS

In this section we will be studying **applied ethics**, a field which uses the analytical skills of philosophy to identify, analyse and/or at least clarify, real-world problems. Our focus will be on two areas of life where ethics are commonly applied: medicine and business. We will begin by examining the issue of euthanasia and how different religious approaches to ethics can bring to the debate. Then, we turn to the work of Immanuel Kant and how his thinking of Kant and the utilitarians is applied to issues such as corporate social responsibility and globalisation.

3A: EUTHANASIA

Key Terminology in the Euthanasia Debate

Before we begin looking at the euthanasia debate in detail, we must first get a handle on the terminology. Euthanasia, which literally translates from the Ancient Greek as 'good death', is the *intentionally ending a life* because it is believed to be the morally correct course of action. There are two main types of euthanasia: **voluntary** and **non-voluntary** euthanasia, which is explained below. The concepts of **quality of life** and **sanctity of life**; the former is crucial to those who are *in favour of* euthanasia (in at least some cases) and the latter is crucial to those who are *against* euthanasia (in at least some cases).

Quality of Life	Sanctity of Life
The idea that the value of a life depends on how satisfying it is to the person living it. An individual who has (or can expect to have) a very low quality of life may not have a life worth living. Hence, not <i>all</i> lives have value.	The idea that each and every human life has an <i>absolute</i> value. Those who are <i>in favour of</i> euthanasia often do so for religious reasons. If life is God-given, it is wrong to end it.
Voluntary Euthanasia	Non-voluntary Euthanasia
When a person chooses to <i>end their own life</i> and requests that another person <i>do it for them</i> . An individual with an incurable or terminal illness requesting that their life be ended by a doctor is an example of voluntary euthanasia.	When another person <i>ends a person's life for them</i> without their consent. A doctor turning off the life support of a patient who has been in a permanent vegetative state for several years is an example of non-voluntary euthanasia.

Active and Passive Euthanasia

A distinction is also sometimes drawn between **active** euthanasia, where something is *done* to cause a person to die (such as the administration of a lethal injection) and **passive** euthanasia, where something is *not done* (or not done) that *indirectly* brings about death (such as withholding treatment that is deemed to be unbearable or that it is not worth living). It is closely related to **acts and omissions**. These concepts are particularly prominent when we come to examine whether there is a moral difference between directly intervening and ending a person's life and indirectly intervening.

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The Application of Natural Law to Euthanasia



The Catholic Church, whose ethical teachings are rooted in the Bible, is not any clearer on the issues of euthanasia: 'No one can murder an innocent person without opposing God's love for that person. A person's own death, or suicide, is therefore equally as wrong as murdering an innocent person is to be considered as a rejection of God's sovereignty. If, as is said, is a 'violation of the divine law' an offense against the Creator, then suicide is a crime against life, and a crime against humanity.'¹⁴

In Natural Law, 'to preserve life' is a **primary precept** – one of a number of God-given principles which govern human beings that Aquinas argues should never be broken. Euthanasia always involves *ending* a life, hence it breaks this rule. From this basis we might conclude that Natural Law theory holds euthanasia is *always* wrong.

Suggested Reading:
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1980) *Declaration on Euthanasia*

Another primary precept which Aquinas may have brought to bear on the euthanasia debate is the precept that society should strive to create an orderly, harmonious society. Opponents of euthanasia argue that legalising the practice could have terrible consequences for society as a whole.

Slippery-slope arguments claim that making one, minor change to the law may have catastrophic consequences. For example, in the euthanasia debate, it has been argued that if we legalise medically-assisted suicide, we would inadvertently put pressure on certain people that euthanasia is an option may strengthen a seriously ill individual's belief that their friends and family. As a result, even if they still want to live, they might feel it is their duty to die. The problem is compounded if they happen to have family members with one eye on the prize of a large inheritance. Just as it is not the slip but the fall which causes the unfortunate mountaineer's death (albeit with good intentions) some fear that if we legalise euthanasia we would be opening the door to a slippery slope of nastiness.

Likewise, the Natural Law theorist may maintain that euthanasia can have no place in a society that has the potential to cause unrest. This rules out **voluntary euthanasia** and **assisted suicide**.

Proportionalism and the doctrine of double effect

However, what of **non-voluntary euthanasia**? It is worth pausing a moment and considering the theory of **proportionalism**. Proportionalism is an ethical theory most commonly associated with the Catholic philosopher Bernard Hoose that is often seen as an attractive middle way between the absolutism of Natural Law and the relativism of Fletcher. Hoose claims, 'It is never right to go against a principle unless there is a proportionate reason which would justify it.'¹⁵ By this, he means that we should generally follow natural moral law until there is a significant reason that would mean it was fair to temporarily set aside these rules. Could euthanasia ever provide a proportionate reason to break a primary precept? In *Issues of Life and Death*, author Michael Wilcockson writes:

'Proportion is a well-established principle in the Natural Law tradition which can be seen individually so that a death might be considered proportionate to achieve the needs of the patient, even the resources of the doctor... For instance, if a doctor were to find that no amount of surgery would improve their condition, he might then prescribe 'nursing care only' (the baby should be kept with its needs knowing that the baby will die shortly).'¹⁶

¹⁴ Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (5th May 1980) *Declaration on Euthanasia*

¹⁵ Quoted in Bowie, R, *Ethical Studies* (Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes Ltd, 2004), p. 106

¹⁶ Wilcockson, M, *Issues of Life and Death* (London: Hodder, 1999), Ch. 4

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The suggestion here is that there may be some room within the Catholic tradition for **euthanasia** but only in very specific circumstances. Indeed, this argument is borne out by the *Declaration on Euthanasia*, which states:

*'When inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used, it is permitted to make a decision to refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not neglected. In such circumstances the doctor has no reason to reproach himself with failing to do his duty.'*¹⁷


The **doctrine of double effect**, which has a long history in the Church, might hold that 'there is a difference between foreseeing an event and directly intending it as a result, certain actions with bad consequences are admissible so long as the direct good consequences outweigh the bad'. It is possible that some forms of euthanasia would satisfy this, which justifies the action. Sometimes, when faced with a patient who is in severe pain and doctors have been known to administer a fatal dose of painkillers. The doctor's intention in the patient (a bad consequence), it is rather simply to put an end to their suffering. Again would be categorised as a form of **passive euthanasia** as the death could be *indirectly*.

However, this argument is at odds with the official position of the Church, which holds that to act which results in death, even if the intention is to end suffering, is against God's law.

*'It may happen that, by reason of prolonged and barely tolerable pain, for a number of people may be led to believe that they can legitimately ask for death or obtain it. In these cases the guilt of the individual may be reduced or completely absent, but the judgment into which the conscience falls, perhaps in good faith, does not change. Killing, which will always be in itself something to be rejected.'*¹⁹

The Application of Situation Ethics to Euthanasia

Fletcher, who wrote often about medical ethics, dealt explicitly with euthanasia in his book titled 'The Right to Die'. He writes:



'The sanctity (what makes it precious) is not in life itself, but in the value of life according to the situation. Compared to some things, the taking of life is a great evil. Compared to some things, the loss of life is a small evil. Death can sometimes be a friend and servant.'

*'Life is sometimes good, and death is sometimes good. Life is good for other value is. It is good, when and if it is good, because of the context. When it is not good, it deserves neither protection nor favor living, not mere life.'*²⁰

Fletcher is here denying the **sanctity of life** and affirming that what really counts is an individual's **quality of life**. Why would he think this? Remember, for Fletcher, the only end worthy of moral consideration is **agape** love and deciding the most loving action requires a situational approach. When it comes to the terminally ill who seek nothing more than an end to their suffering, Fletcher is prepared to say 'Life is sometimes good, and death is sometimes good'; there are no absolutes, and **relativism** (one of the **four working principles**) is the order of the day.

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¹⁷ Ibid. 2

¹⁸ Ibid. 4

¹⁹ Ibid. 2

²⁰ Bard, B & Fletcher, J, 'The Right to Die' in *The Atlantic Monthly*, 221, 1968

Voluntary euthanasia, then, so long as it is the most loving course of action, would be a situation ethicist. What about *non-voluntary* euthanasia though? Here, Fletcher is in more territory:

'People... have no reason to feel guilty about putting a Down's syndrome baby away' in the sense of hidden in a sanitarium or in a more responsible lethal chamber. But it carries no guilt. True guilt arises only from an offense against a person... There is far more reason for real guilt in keeping alive a Down's syndrome baby, a false idea of obligation or duty, while at the same time feeling no obligation to care for a living, learning child.

It is a startling claim. The evidence of just how seriously Fletcher took the situation is shown in his comments made in response to an article written by a father whose baby boy with Down's syndrome. The couple, who already had one child at home, took their son to a sanatorium (a type of hospital, rare nowadays, which cares for those with long-term conditions). The child died a few days later of heart failure. The father felt, however, that, were it possible, it would be preferable for the baby to have been euthanised shortly after birth.

Fletcher agrees with the father, and believes that this would actually be the more loving action. His reasoning turns on his definition of **personhood**:

*'To be a human is to be self-aware, consciously related to others, capable of rationality in a measure at least sufficient to support some initiative. If, absent, or cannot ever come to be, there is neither a potential nor an actual personhood more than just to be alive... The fact that a biological organism functions as such is not more than just to be alive... The fact that a biological organism functions as such is not more than just to be alive... The fact that a biological organism functions as such is not more than just to be alive... There is a difference between a man and a brute.'*²²

An individual with severely diminished mental faculties, according to this definition, is unable to decide for themselves whether or not they wish to die. The decision must be made by people who are most affected by their living or dying – in this case, the parents.

It is worth noting that the medical understanding and treatment of children with intellectual disabilities has developed significantly since this article was written, and so too have cultural attitudes. A father, or indeed Fletcher, would express the same views today is impossible to know.

Group Activity:

Divide up into two groups: situation ethicists and Natural Law theorists. Then, as a class, discuss which ethical approach would say about each of the following:

- sanctity of life
- quality of life
- voluntary euthanasia
- non-voluntary euthanasia

Now, individually, jot down a sentence or two explaining what you think your approach would say. Afterwards, discuss as a class your results. Which approach do you think is best suited to the issue raised by euthanasia?

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²¹ Ibid.


²² Ibid.

Euthanasia: The Legal Situation in the UK

The legal situation surrounding euthanasia in the UK is complicated.

- **The Suicide Act of 1961** decriminalised the act of suicide. Previously, individuals who attempted suicide were liable to be prosecuted. However, it was still illegal to assist someone to end their own life.
- In **2006**, the Assisted Dying Bill, which would have allowed terminally ill individuals to receive assistance to end their lives, was rejected by the House of Lords.
- In **2009**, Debby Purdy, a multiple sclerosis sufferer, brought a case to the High Court for clarification of the law. She wanted to travel to the Dignitas clinic in Switzerland to end her own life. However, she wanted to know if her husband, who would accompany her, could be prosecuted for assisting her suicide. At the time, the law stated that any person who assisted another person to commit suicide could face up to 14 years in jail.
 - After a lengthy legal battle, the House of Lords finally issued a ruling: the factors such as the nature of the victim's illnesses would have to be taken into account before prosecution could take place.
 - The ruling was hailed by pro-euthanasia campaigners as a victory, because people would *not* be prosecuted for assisting with their partner's suicide.
 - ✓ This is supported by the fact that, although over 100 British citizens have travelled to Dignitas since 2002, none of their relatives have been prosecuted in the UK.
- Groups such as the Campaign for Dignity in Dying continue to pressure the government for legal reform.

The changing face of euthanasia legislation in the UK



Key Issues


Does the concept of sanctity of life have any meaning in twenty-first-century

'The desire among the citizens of modern democracies for control over how they die', writes Peter Singer, and this 'marks a sharp turning away from the **sanctity of life** ethic.'²³ In its turning towards an ethic based on considerations about **quality of life**. The decline of the **sanctity of life** ethic in the Western world, means that the idea of life being inviolable / sacred is increasingly irrelevant. Individuals are concerned more about the **quality** of their life: whether it is enjoyable and meaningful. Particularly for those with serious illness, the idea that one cannot end a life of suffering against the teachings of a religion they do not believe in, is exasperating. The clarity surrounding euthanasia is undoubtedly growing. The pressure group Dying with Dignity has successfully changed in the Netherlands legislation to allow those with terminal illness to receive help to end their lives.

Often, however, this desire is at odds with the strictures of both religious and secular ethics. The Catholic *Declaration on Euthanasia* states:

'Today it is very important to protect, at the moment of death, both the dignity of the person and the Christian concept of life, against a technological attitude that threatens to reduce life to a mere biological process.'

The threat 'to become an abuse' mentioned here is a reference to the **slippery-slope** argument (see above). The charge here is that legalising voluntary euthanasia may inadvertently lead to non-voluntary euthanasia (where a person's life is ended *against* their wishes; murder, for all intents and purposes). The response to that claim is to look at the situation in countries where voluntary euthanasia is legal, such as the Netherlands or Belgium.



The utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer examined the effects of liberalising euthanasia in the Netherlands. He found that 1,000 deaths have been attributed to euthanasia in the Netherlands. These cases, Singer found, represent barely 2 per cent – of all the deaths related to illness – but have nevertheless been seized upon by critics. There appears to be a limited amount of non-voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands in extreme circumstances, no cases of 'involuntary euthanasia' came to light.²⁵ Singer concludes that, based on the available evidence, the **slippery-slope** effect has not occurred, and so it is not a good argument against euthanasia.

Suggested Reading
Singer, P., *The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics*, Chapter 7

Critics might argue, however, that even if there has not been a **slippery-slope** effect in the Netherlands, it still occurs where euthanasia is legalised in other countries. Singer himself accepts that the Dutch system with euthanasia may not be easily replicable in other countries. Americans, in particular, should remember that the Netherlands is a welfare state that provides a high standard of living for all its citizens. No patients need to ask for euthanasia because they are unable to afford medical care.



²³ Singer, P, *Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics* (New York: Random House, 1994), p. 152.

²⁴ Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (5th May 1980)

²⁵ Singer, P, 1994. *Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics* (New York: Random House), pp. 152–153

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 158

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Rejecting the **sanctity of life** in favour of a **quality of life** ethic raises particular problems for **voluntary euthanasia**. Voluntary euthanasia presumes that people know the quality of their own life (and, of course, they who are living it), but how can we judge the quality of someone else's life? The medical ethicist Jonathon Glover, is to imagine what we would do were we in their shoes. Would we want to keep on living if we were in a persistent vegetative state? If we would, then voluntary euthanasia is justified. Glover concedes that the test is problematic (would we prefer to be dead, but others say they would keep on living?), but claims it is a useful one. Likewise, he argues that, handled incorrectly, this test could have quite horrific consequences. Disabled infants were better off dead, and a programme of extermination was justified. Holocaust. Glover here essentially points out that the good moral character of the doctor, the commandant of a concentration camp, he writes, 'is not the kind of person you want to be in charge of the National Health Service'.



Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide and Assisted Dying

It is worth noting that Dying in Dignity argue that they advocate only assisted dying, which distinguishes them from both voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. Their website states:

'Assisted dying only applies to terminally ill, mentally competent adults, after meeting strict legal safeguards, to self-administer life-ending medication.'

Voluntary euthanasia, on the other hand, allows for a doctor to administer the lethal injection. Assisted suicide allows non-terminally ill individuals to end their lives with the assistance of another person. The legal situation worldwide is also reflected in these distinctions:

	Legal in...
Assisted dying	US States of Washington and Oregon
Assisted suicide	Switzerland (e.g. Dignitas)
Voluntary euthanasia	Netherlands and Belgium

All of the above are currently *illegal* in the UK.

It can be argued that there is no *moral* difference between voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, but there is a legal one. If I am in possession of cyanide and a friend tells me that they want to die, does it make any difference whether I hand them a pill and they swallow it themselves, or I inject the drug for them and I comply? Either way, I have provided the means for their death. In the view of the ethicist Jonathan Glover, 'The difference between voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide is that the final act is performed by someone else but... it is hard to see why it matters who puts the pill in the man's mouth.' Nevertheless, he also argues that 'If assisted suicide is preferred to voluntary euthanasia... where the person does not perform the final act, there is always more room for doubt about the extent to which he desired death. It seems more likely that he might ask for pills and at the last minute not take them, but feel inhibited about changing his mind to the person about to carry out his request to give him a lethal injection.' (Glover, *Death and Saving Lives* (London: Penguin, 1977), pp. 164-165)



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²⁷ Glover, J, *Causing Death and Saving Lives* (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 201

²⁸ <https://www.dignityindying.org.uk/>

Should people have complete autonomy over their own life?

If we reject a **sanctity of life** ethic, and place **quality of life** and **autonomy** at the heart of medical decision-making, where does that leave us? Glover argues 'voluntary euthanasia is justified in those cases where we know that the person would commit suicide if he could, and where we believe that the conditions that would make it right to allow or assist a suicide are satisfied.'²⁹ We can break this claim down into three main points:

- Firstly, we must understand *why* someone would wish to end their life.
 - The impulse to suicide is found in all cases, on the belief that death indicates not just a **loss of quality of life**, but a *negative* one: life is considered *worthless*.
- Secondly, we must consider when, if ever, it is morally permissible to *allow* someone to end their life.
 - Suicide desires born of deep depression can pass, even if, to the sufferer, the dark cloud is all-consuming. Allowing someone to end their life when there is a possibility, even a slim one, that their mind can be changed is not permissible, because there is still hope that a better quality of life can obtain. So the individual's will must be resistant to all attempts (e.g. through medical treatment, through the support of friends or family) to change it.
 - If a person's desire to end their life is so strong that nothing can alter it, they should be allowed to commit suicide. Glover writes, 'some suicide decisions are quite rational and based on a very clear assessment of their future lives, so that interference is unjustified'. If we respect **autonomy**, then sometimes suicide must be morally permissible.
- Thirdly, we must consider the circumstances when it would be right to *assist* someone to end their life.
 - The most ardent campaigners for the legalisation of **voluntary euthanasia** are entirely made up, but they are not physically able to end their lives. In these circumstances, it is rational to assume that improving their quality of life is not possible. If we respect the individual's **autonomy**, then it must be right to assist them to end their life.
 - For everybody to have a **right**, then there needs to be a corresponding right for others to respect it. If nobody respects the right, then **autonomy** is being denied.
 - Respecting a **right to die** may require the assistance of others if the person is unable to do so. If we (as a society) do not help them, by, for example, providing them with the means to end their life, then, the argument runs, we are denying them their **autonomy**.

There are a few criticisms that someone may make of this account:

- The concepts of autonomy and rationality are problematic. Particularly in the post-modern stream of philosophy, they come under heavy attack. Usually, the claim is along the lines that such ideas are culturally relative or reflect only the experience of a dominant social group. If it is true that autonomy lacks validity as a concept, then much work in medical ethics would be undermined.
- Even if we have a clear idea of what is and is not rational, it can still be difficult to judge the extent to which other factors (the pressure of family members, etc.) have, perhaps unconsciously, impacted on a person's decision to end their life.
- The Catholic Church argues that the only 'right to die' one has is 'the right to refuse medical treatment'.³¹ The argument, then, is that since we are all God's creation, we have a duty to live against God's will and is therefore immoral.

²⁹ Ibid. p. 185

³⁰ Ibid., p. 180

³¹ Ibid, p. 10

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Is there any moral difference between intervening and not intervening to end suffering?

We touched on the distinction between **active** and **passive** euthanasia when discussing the Natural Law to euthanasia. In effect, it claims there is a difference between a doctor *actively* doing or not doing something which allows a patient to die and a doctor *passively* doing or not doing something which allows a patient to die. The doctor either provides the life-saving treatment, or they administer it to the willing patient to self-administer, or they administer it to the patient directly.

However, there are cases of involuntary euthanasia. A doctor might be said to have euthanised an individual simply by *not* doing something. Most often, this takes place in cases where a patient is going to die, and the doctor – usually because it would ultimately be pointless – chooses not to give treatment that would prolong life. The question of whether there is a difference between intervening and not intervening can be framed as a distinction between **acts** and **omissions**. Intuitively, many of us would draw a difference between actively intervening to bring about some result, and simply omitting to do something. For instance, by *not* giving money to a certain charity, we may allow someone to die from starvation. We would normally say this is very different from actually killing them ourselves.



Tries to volunteer

Nevertheless, we can imagine more problematic cases:

- (i) You are eating alone in a restaurant. I want you to die, so I walk in and shoot you.
- (ii) You are eating alone in a restaurant. I want you to die. I walk in, pistol raised, and you begin to choke on a piece of food. You motion desperately for me to help. I perform the Heimlich manoeuvre. I simply stand there, watching you die.

It is clear in (i) that I am responsible for your death, but case (ii) is more complex. If I decide not to bother, do I deserve some blame for you dying? If I perform the Heimlich manoeuvre, I got what I wanted. This would suggest something like a distinction between acts and omissions.

When applied to euthanasia, we might wonder whether it matters whether we actively intervene to end suffering or simply allow them to die; what really matters is our intention. If the intention does not matter if the doctor withholds life-saving treatment or provides life-ending treatment, then the distinction between acts and omissions is irrelevant.

Written Activity 5: Euthanasia

- Sanctity of life is largely a religious concept, and quality of life is largely a secular concept. Discuss.
- What is voluntary euthanasia?
- What is non-voluntary euthanasia?
- Give one reason a follower of Natural Law would argue against voluntary euthanasia.
- Give one reason a follower of utilitarianism might argue against assisted suicide.
- Which utilitarian philosopher has advocated a revision of euthanasia laws?

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


3B: BUSINESS ETHICS

Put the words 'business' and 'ethics' together and many will claim you have an oxymoron. In the business world's murky dealings, exploitation and greed are rife in the media, leading to the belief that business ethics is a contradiction. So why waste time talking about business ethics?

We must distinguish between what it is for something to be *non-moral* and what it is to be *immoral*. If we say something is *non-moral*, we say that it is fundamentally not a moral issue and is separate from the ethical universe. If we say that something is *immoral*, we say that it is a moral issue, but that that thing is falling short of it.

It would be a mistake to think that business is *non-moral* if a human activity so profoundly interwoven with all aspects of life that it cannot have any moral character whatsoever. If business were *non-moral*, like a tree, we would not have newspaper articles decrying tax evasion or campaigns to bring an end to child labour. The fact that we have an assumption to think business does have a moral aspect. Business ethics, then, is the study of the moral dilemmas business activity and decisions tend to provoke. This section will move forward on what ethical responsibilities businesses have, and to whom they have responsibilities.



Retired magnate Sir Phillip Green, and the former owner of BHS. The bankrupted BHS is unable to fund its former staff's pensions, despite Green collecting hundreds of millions from the company in dividends.



Former CEO of Apple, Steve Jobs (1955–2011). The labour practices in the factories where Apple products are made have been criticised by many.

Discussion Point:

Above are two examples of prominent business people whose companies have fallen on their faces. What, if anything, is wrong with what they have done?

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Corporate Social Responsibility

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is supported by both pragmatic and ethical arguments. The former will be discussed under the heading 'Good Ethics is Good Business' below. The argument that businesses have a moral obligation to their **stakeholders** will be covered here.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is supported by both pragmatic and ethical arguments. The former will be discussed under the heading 'Good Ethics is Good Business' below. The argument that businesses have a moral obligation to their **stakeholders** will be covered here.

Crane and Matten provide several reasons for why we might think businesses have a moral obligation to be socially responsible:

- Businesses, particularly highly profitable ones, wield immense social and political power. With power and wealth, they have a duty to use it responsibly.
- Business activity does not exist in a vacuum, but can have both positive and negative effects on other people. Consider the recent crisis prompted by the announcement that the TATA steelworks in Port Talbot, Wales, was to shut down. Mass redundancies in a small town can have enormous knock-on effects on the local economy; the money earned by workers at the large industry can support many smaller businesses. Without that revenue, they too may go bust. The social cost of widespread unemployment and economic decline.
- Businesses always rely on other people in order to function. 'Self-made men' do not exist. Businesses have their business empires without a chain of suppliers and consumers to provide them with raw materials and products. Businesses rely on schools to educate their workers, hospitals to keep them healthy, and so on. If businesses are reliant on society to succeed, they have a reciprocal duty to society.
- Some businesses cause environmental damage, and as a result, have a duty to repair it. The oil spill in 2010 is a good example of this.

CSR entails considering the interests of the businesses' various **stakeholders** and also the interests of society. Before considering its duties to stakeholders, a business should consider what its duties are to society.

Stakeholders are those who have an interest in the business and its activities. They include suppliers, customers, employees, and the local community.

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Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholders

Stakeholder	Why is it a stakeholder?	
Employees	Legal: Employees have a contract with their employer which specifies duties on the parts of both parties (e.g. my duty is to serve your business's customers, your duty is to pay me, provide the uniform, etc.). Sole traders aside, businesses cannot function without employees, so the latter necessarily have a stake in the former.	Depend on social responsibilities which include trade unions enough to determine places within the law
Customers	Businesses, on the whole, are more likely to succeed when they satisfy their customers' needs. If they do not, they risk losing those customers to a competitor. Therefore, customers have a stake in the business, to the extent that the business needs them to thrive.	Consumers are, therefore, which are business dignity and
Local community	Local communities are often heavily dependent on a particular industry or industries for their existence. Businesses too may need employees or customers from the local area.	Businesses have a responsibility
Country as a whole	Certain businesses and sectors contribute an enormous amount to the GDP (gross domestic product) of a nation. For example, financial services contribute around £129bn to the UK economy. ³² Therefore, the country as a whole has a stake in the sector's prosperity.	Large businesses are crucial to the country with the financial result, and to prevent
Governments	Governments are stakeholders in businesses because they set up the regulatory framework and the social system in which the latter operate. Likewise, businesses and governments may have mutual interests, e.g. employment, economic growth.	Business actions within a two-way relationship with the state

³² <https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/statistics/Documents/an-industry>

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Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment

The problem with the relationship between businesses and the environment is that consumers or employers, is not able to defend itself. The environment has no 'senses'; businesses are, in theory, able to exploit the environment until its resources are damaged to be used any more. It is therefore up to the stakeholders of companies to reform this relationship.


Many people argue that the nature of economic growth and business practice in the modern environment. It is argued that the burning of fossil fuels is releasing CO₂ into the atmosphere, causing climate change; resources used are being depleted; air pollution and contamination of water supplies; and environmental resources is damaging ecosystems and increasing risk of flooding and landslides.

Some argue that this process can be reformed so that there can be 'green growth' which can continue but in a way that does not damage the environment. A minority argue that economic growth should be halted, or even reversed, to ensure the environment is no longer damaged. 'green growth' is a contradiction. Such an approach often considers the world to be a finite resource and that damage should be done to it, regardless of the human benefit that could have been gained.

At the other end of the spectrum are scholars such as Julian Simon, a professor at the University of Maryland, who argues that environmental problems do not need to be solved as the world is the best it has ever been. He argues that any future shortages can be solved through technological innovation and that resources are not becoming scarcer, and rejects evidence of an extinction crisis.

Gross and Krueger have similarly argued that the prospects of environmental damage are not as bad as thought by some. The pair developed the **environmental Kuznets curve** to model the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality, and predicted that while environmental damage will increase as an economy grows, it will begin to decrease once a sufficient level of economic wealth is attained.

They use the example that during industrialisation (the early stages of growth) people are more interested in jobs and income than clean air and water, communities are too poor to pay for any green technology, and the government is yet to implement any environmental regulation. When incomes are high enough, these factors start to reverse.³⁴



While some of the data behind the Kuznets curve is supported by empirical evidence, such as sulphur in the atmosphere has decreased, the majority of the empirical evidence is not. Developing countries that have recently gone through the process of industrialisation have followed this model and been much 'greener' than when the West industrialised.

Views on the effect of business and growth on the environment will ultimately be determined by the evidence available. Scholars on both sides of the argument have evidence that seems to support their view.

³³ Myers, N, and Julian, S, *Scarcity or Abundance?* (New York: W W Norton, 1994). This book was written by Julian and Myers, an ecologist, at Colombia in 1992, in which Myers challenges Julian's views.

³⁴ Dasgupta, S, Laplante, B, Wang, H, and Wheeler, D, 'Confronting the Environmental Kuznets Curve', *Perspectives* Vol. 16 No. 1 (2002), pp. 147–168.

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Scholars such as R Edward Freeman, Jessica Pierce and Richard Dodd have responded to this problem by saying we should use Pascal's Wager.³⁵ Pascal's Wager originally said that it is better to believe in God because the risks of not believing and being wrong are much greater (burning in hell) than believing and being wrong. Applied to environmental ethics, this means that it is better to believe environmental damage is real and likely to get worse, because the risks of not acting involve potentially catastrophic implications.

Whistle-Blowing

The most famous whistle-blower in recent years is Edward Snowden, who leaked secrets about the intelligence operations of the US government. Other whistle-blowers remain anonymous, such as 'Deep Throat', who informed journalists at the *Washington Post* about illegal re-election tactics by Richard Nixon, who was later forced to resign as President of the USA.

Whistle-blower is a term used to describe a person who discloses the actions of a person or organisation who has committed unlawful or immoral activity.

Whistle-blowers can improve the practices of employers towards their employees by highlighting malpractice and creating pressure on them to reform. The fear of whistle-blowers can also create incentives for employers to not engage in any kind of illegal practice in the first place. Whistle-blowers can, however, create problems. Some have been critical of the actions of Edward Snowden because of the potentially sensitive material he disclosed, which could put US citizens at risk. Others argue that it can contravene confidentiality agreements made by employees, as well as the implied loyalty to employers. Whistle-blowing is supported in UK law (Disclosure Act 1998), which is 'An Act to protect individuals who make certain disclosures in the public interest'.³⁶

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Good Ethics is Good Business

One of the strongest arguments for businesses engaging in ethically responsible behaviour, from the point of view of the business owner, is that it is in their interest to do so. Crane and Matten argue that there are several reasons why businesses which may result from a company doing their bit for the common good.

- Socially responsible businesses may attract more customers. Note for example, the popularity of recycled goods, franchised hot-drink outlets using fair trade coffee or the practice of paying the living wage. Embracing such practices can be used in marketing to enhance a business's public image or green credentials.
- Employees may be more attracted to work for companies which embrace social responsibility. They may also work harder if they believe their employer is socially responsible.
- Investing in society may, in the long run, bring gains for a business as a safer, more stable world could be an easier place to do a profit.
- Acting socially responsibly may prevent government legislation which forces companies to be more responsible.

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³⁵ Quoted in Werhane, P H, and Freeman, E, 'Business Ethics' A Companion to Applied Ethics, ed. by J. J. Thoma (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), p. 547.

³⁶ <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/23/introduction>

In short, then, adopting as a mantra ‘good ethics is good business’ can be beneficial to **profit-making**.

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Markets may also incentivise ethical business behaviour by only offering a place in some markets if businesses act in ethically responsible ways. A place in such a market may put a business in the shop window for investors. Likewise, current **shareholders** may benefit from being listed on such stock markets. An example of this is the FTSE4G index – an offshoot of the UK’s major stock market, the FTSE100 – assigns businesses commitment to ‘strong Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) practices.’³⁷ measures companies on factors such as:

- their commitment to reducing pollution, mitigating the effects of climate change
- their support for ethical labour standards, human rights and safe working environments
- the soundness of their governance structure, e.g. risk management, tax transparency measures

Investing in businesses and markets such as these is known as **socially responsible investing**. It is clear that such a strategy will actually make an investor more money, but it may not be. Once again, good ethics is still good business.

Globalisation

Globalisation is the phenomenon of increasing global integration of different countries and ideas. This has come about because of how much easier it is for people and products to cross boundaries and for international communication to take place. One of the major outcomes of this has been the growth of international trade and transnational businesses. The products we use on a daily basis have often been made in numerous different countries (where it is often cheaper to produce them) and the companies we buy them from have offices and shops across the world. This has had major impacts on almost all groups of **stakeholders**.

Globalisation refers to the integrated nature of the world. Economies, industries, policy-making are global. As a result, one country can have an impact on several others.

Perhaps the biggest winner from globalisation is the **consumer**, who, due to the ease with which international trade is conducted, has access to a wider variety of goods. They’re also often cheaper too, because globalisation has allowed businesses to outsource manufacturing or production to countries where labour costs are lower. The biggest losers, arguably, are the **governments** of nation states. The immense wealth of multinational corporations and the fact that they can pick and choose the country whose legal framework best suits their needs means they can exert considerable pressure on politicians to do their bidding. Politicians in recent years have been keen to stress that ‘Britain is open for business’, but the implication is that each nation must compete with the rest of the world for trade.



Somewhere in the middle are **employees**, whose job opportunities are now not only determined by the national economy, but also by the global economy. The decline of manufacturing is often attributed to globalisation, with large parts of the industry moving overseas.

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³⁷ FTSE Russell, <http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/f4g-index-inclusion-rules.pdf>

³⁸ Collison, D J et al. ‘The Financial Performance of the FTSE4Good Indices’ in *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*

The so-called 'race to the bottom' is the argument that, in order to compete with investment, advanced nations may cut wages and weaken labour protections. The on these issues, such as through the International Labour Organisation (ILO), but international law is often weak. On the other hand, in some parts of the world, globalisation has brought employment opportunities that had simply not existed previously. A similar story can be told for **communities**, who can either benefit or suffer from globalisation depending on the circumstances. Globalisation can bring wealth and jobs to an area, but it may also fundamentally alter the character of an area, which is upsetting to long-term residents.

Issues

Does globalisation encourage or discourage the pursuit of ethical business practices?

Some of the effects, both positive and negative, of globalisation were discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, we will consider the effect it has had on business practice, and whether those practices are ethical. Countries such as America have put a lot of pressure on other countries, especially developing countries, to open up their markets to international competition as part of a global '**free market**', through organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Major economists have been advocating this, claiming that the West has historically, and still today, used trade quotas (limits on the amount of goods that can be imported) to distort markets in their favour. The approach they advocate. Ha-Joon Chang, an economist, has, for example, argued that the approach for developing countries the USA and the West have 'kicked away the ladder' that they themselves used to increase economic growth.

There have also been large protests against the impact of globalisation, such as the WTO protests in Seattle in 1999. Other economists, however, claim that free trade has brought benefits for the poor, such as in India and China where it has lifted millions out of poverty.

Another ethical issue important to globalisation is the treatment of workers in developing countries by transnational businesses. The collapse of the **Rana Plaza factory** building near Dhaka in Bangladesh in 2013 killed over 1,000 workers and injured thousands more. The unsafe conditions employees have been working in, such as clothes that were not fireproof, have been compared to those in the West. There are also frequent concerns about the treatment of workers in the supply chain and the payment of a living wage.

While companies implicated in the Rana Plaza disaster have made commitments to improve their practices, companies often choose which countries to invest in based on the low levels of regulation. They do not need to pay a fair wage, spend money to ensure safe working conditions, or follow other ethical standards.

On the flip side, multinational corporations operating in nations with limited infrastructure have been investing in services such as healthcare and education in order to expand their market. The aim may not be entirely altruistic, but the local people may be better off than they would be without the business. Since there is little business incentive to invest heavily in infrastructure where it is already well-developed, it is fair to say that globalisation has, at least on occasion, brought about ethically good things. Equally, however, governments keen to attract overseas business have often invested in infrastructure which will benefit those businesses, rather than the people at large.

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Discussion Point:

Political commentators are worried that globalisation is a factor in both the election of Donald Trump and Brexit.

Why might this be? Are they right?

The Application of Kantian Ethics to Business Ethics

Bowie describes how 'Kant is best known for defining a version of the 'respect for persons' principle which implies that any business practice that puts money on a par with people is immoral'.³⁹ Kant writes in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* that a core ethical principle is to 'treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as the same time as end, never as a means'.⁴⁰ Therefore, in business, as in all other spheres of life, moral agents should treat others in way that recognises their **autonomy** and freedom, and never as a way to achieve something else. They should not be coerced or deceived. Equally, as Bowie writes, 'business organisations and business practices should be arranged so that they contribute to the development of human rational capacities, rather than inhibit the development of these capacities'.⁴⁰

Bowie argues that according to Kant, work for employees should:

- be freely chosen and provide opportunities for the worker to exercise autonomy on the job
- support the autonomy and rationality of human beings
- provide a salary sufficient to exercise independence and provide for physical needs of some of the worker's desires
- enable a worker to develop rational capacities
- not interfere with a worker's moral development

William H Shaw argues that Kant has an important contribution to make on this point. 'Many would say that respect for the inherent worth and dignity of human beings is at odds with business, where encroaching technology and computerization tend to dehumanize the workplace in the name of efficiency. Kant's theory puts the emphasis of organizational decision making where it should be: on the human beings who are affected. Another principle that can be applied from Kantian ethics to business ethics is the universalizability test. Kant's theory states that one should 'act only on that maxim whereby which you at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. This includes actions in business equally to actions outside of work – therefore lying, cheating, and other actions which are not logically consistent when applied universally and are morally wrong.

Kantian ethics, a deontological theory, is concerned with the motivation rather than the consequences of actions. Businesses should therefore always act morally because they know it is their **duty** to act morally. This removes the opportunity to be egotistic or indulge self-interest, a common feature of businesses. It would also condemn businesses for being ethical in order to attract more customers because the motive is profit, not being ethical out of duty.

The Application of Utilitarianism to Business Ethics

The utilitarian perspective encourages a greater balance of pleasure and happiness over pain, not just for the individual but for society at large. Business individuals therefore need to take into account not just the happiness or preference of their shareholders but also the happiness and preference of all workers and other stakeholders. Employees are therefore all of equal consideration and employees are equal to other stakeholders. This could challenge the structure in many businesses where shareholders are the prime consideration in business decision making.

It was Bentham's focus on the importance and consideration owed to the working class that led to many reforms in Britain that improved the rights and working conditions of the poor. Bentham would also probably encourage strikes

³⁹ Bowie, N E, 'A Kantian Approach to Business Ethics' in *A Companion to Business Ethics* (Blackwell, 1999), p. 3.

⁴⁰ Bowie, N E, 'A Kantian Approach to Business Ethics' in *A Companion to Business Ethics* (Blackwell, 1999), p. 8.

⁴¹ Shaw, W H, *Business Ethics* (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1991), p. 61.

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and political action which ensures that the happiness of all stakeholders is considered. Developing countries who might not be considered equally by multinational companies.

Taking a utilitarian approach is arguably harder with globalisation when so many are affected by business decisions. The decision, such as to close a factory in one country where wages are lower and more jobs can be created and profits increased for the company, is very hard to quantify in terms of overall happiness.

Group Activity:

Divide up into two groups: utilitarians and Kantians. Then, as a group, discuss what you would say about each of the following issues:

- corporate social responsibility
- whistleblowing
- 'Good ethics is good business'
- globalisation

Now, individually, jot down a sentence or two explaining what you think your approach would be. Afterwards, discuss as a class your results. Which approach do you think is best?


Is the concept of corporate social responsibility no more than 'hypocritical'?

Milton Friedman was a twentieth-century American economist who was a staunch defender of capitalism. As an advisor to both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, his thoughts influenced the economic policy of the USA and the UK in the 1980s. To understand Friedman's view on **corporate social responsibility**, it may be helpful to briefly consider his political philosophy.

In a 1987 interview, Thatcher gave the country the words she will forever be remembered for: 'There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And we are concerned with anything except through people, and people are looking to themselves first. It's only afterwards, and then, also to look after our neighbours.'

If Friedman had been present, he would have been nodding his head enthusiastically. Friedman's political philosophy, **individualism**, holds that, first and foremost, people have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and have the right to act as they wish (so long as they abide by the law). 'In an individual's private property,' he wrote:

'No individual can coerce any other, all parties to such cooperation benefit or the parties are not values, no 'social' responsibilities, shared values and responsibilities of individuals and of the various groups.'



Friedman's problem with corporate social responsibilities only exist for individuals, and not for companies. A business may be the creation of a single individual, but those people may have responsibilities, but the business itself does not. A business is what is termed in law an 'artificial person'; a legal entity which may have certain legal rights or responsibilities, but not moral ones.

Suggested Reading:
Friedman, M, 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits', in *The New York Times*, September 13, 1970

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⁴² Interview for *Woman's Own* (September 23, 1987)

⁴³ Friedman, M, 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits', in *The New York Times*, September 13, 1970

Furthermore, Friedman thinks, in the case of large businesses – the kind of business suggested have social responsibilities – the individuals involved generally only have the company as profitable as possible. This is because the individuals involved are shareholders, and it is the shareholders' desires which need to be fulfilled. Any other argument goes, is there voluntarily: they have freely chosen to enter into an agreement to abide by it. Diverting company funds to any other end than making a profit is to do so hence is liable grounds for being laid off.

So, Friedman says, when businesses tout their corporate social responsibility programme, all they will ever be doing is investing in the area that they consider will be most profitable for them. Hence, the 'hypocritical window-dressing'; CSR is just a bit of public relations fluff put about to make the business appear to be morally concerned, when in reality, it is just an extension of their regular commercial activities. Friedman takes particular issue with this because 'it helps to strengthen the already too prevalent view that the pursuit of profits is wicked and immoral and must be curbed.'⁴⁴ If we allow that view to take hold, Friedman argues, we will be opening the door to **collectivism**, a political philosophy which puts the needs of the individual parts. At the time Friedman was writing (and to some extent even today) was synonymous with Communist Russia, or, as Ronald Reagan had it, the 'Evil Empire'. Corporate social responsibility, in Friedman's view, was not only disingenuous, but a threat to a free society.⁴⁵



Crane and Matten raise two problems with Friedman's critique:

- (i) It is not clear that just because businesses are not individual people, but instead are corporations, they still have moral responsibilities. The reason human beings are supposed to be able to choose actions for which they can be held responsible. We do not hold a corporation responsible for the deaths caused by flash flooding because it does not choose the flow of water.

Can a business be said to make choices that are not just the choices of human beings, but in reality, a large business may have internal decision-making structures, organisational culture which are independent of any single individual. Such structures determine how it acts, and so, in a sense, it has a kind of life of its own. Senior managers are acting in line with the organisational culture, which they do not choose. Hence, a business which, for whatever reason, has developed a culture has a decision-making structure which does not consider the environmental impact. It is considered morally responsible for those actions, even though they cannot be held responsible.

It is a peculiar argument, and it is hard to believe Friedman would have accepted it. Matten contend that 'there is general support from business ethics literature for the view that responsibility to be accredited to corporations.'⁴⁶

- (ii) Friedman's claim that the individual employee's only responsibility is to the company is problematic. The various moral principles provided for corporate social responsibility programmes. In effect, Friedman's claim to succeed, one needs to accept his ideological underpinnings. It is not to say that they are controversial.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Crane, A & Matten, D, *Business Ethics* (Oxford: OUP, 2003)

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Can human beings flourish in a capitalist, consumerist society?

Friedman contends that the ideal society is one in which people have the freedom to pursue their ends without interference and he believes that this is only possible in a **capitalist** society. For Friedman, and those like him, freedom is inextricably bound up with human flourishing. A society which places unwarranted limits on its citizens' freedom is an unjust society, and therefore 'unethical'.

Consumerist is a society in which people are attached to social status and material possessions, and where there is ever greater materialism.

Capitalism is an economic system in which the means of production are controlled by private individuals or corporations for profit.

It is important to note that Friedman has a very particular idea of freedom in mind. In 1958, the political theorist Isaiah Berlin wrote an essay titled 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in which he distinguished between two forms of liberty: negative and positive. Negative liberty is so called because it is the freedom *from* interference; it is an absence of constraints on a person's actions. For instance, freedom of religion is the freedom to practise one's religion *without* anyone being able to prevent you from doing so. Positive liberty, on the other hand, is the freedom *to* determine the course of one's life. For instance, on a negative conception of liberty, the poorest members of a society are free because they face the same lack of interference as everyone else. On a positive conception, they are not free, because they do not have the means to shape the course of their life. Instead, the course of their life is determined by someone else, wealthy business owners, for example.

Friedman's idea of freedom is a negative one, it is about a lack of interference. Berlin also championed this same notion, arguing that positive freedom requires **collectivism**, which, like Friedman, he believed would lead to the kind of authoritarianism prevalent in Communist Russia.

By now, you may have noticed how heavily the shadow of the Cold War loomed over Capitalism, it was seen as necessary for a free society. Any attempt to rein in the system would send us on a very steep slope to authoritarianism. (At this juncture, it should be pointed out that some form of freedom is necessary for human flourishing. It is only real freedom that is not those espoused by Mussolini and Hitler, which would outright deny this claim.)

For defenders of a positive concept of freedom, such a view is wrong-headed. To say that in the capitalist society, with its gross inequalities, all people are equal is to say that I have many more options than if I am very poor. I might take a holiday in Barbados, or I might send my children to private school, or I might move house so that I can send them to a better area. If I do not like my job, I can leave it, because I can support myself for as long as I need. These seem to be freedoms, and they seem to exist for some but not for others.

Critiques of capitalism abound in philosophy and the social sciences, including in Friedman's own discipline of economics. Marx, who was first a philosopher and later an economist, is without doubt capitalism's most influential critic. His view, broadly speaking, was that capitalism is the exploitation of the masses by a wealthy few who control trade and industry. It is impossible, Marx thought, for (most) human beings to flourish in a capitalist society because the system necessitates that workers are alienated from the products of their labour. When the worker produces something, they do not immediately benefit from it and sold for a profit. So, they are alienated from what they create. They do not enjoy the work, and, if it were not a necessity, they would not do it. So they are alienated from the activity which constitutes much of their working life. Finally, in a capitalist society, where money governs nearly all relations between people, they are alienated from the rest of their species; wealth, rather than need, determines how other people interact with them.

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Marx's conception of freedom is positive: it requires that the worker owns the products of their labour, rather than the business. They do not have freedom insofar as their opportunities are determined by an unequal balance of wealth. That freedom will only be achieved if we act as a **collective** which puts the interests of all ahead of the individual. That might mean interfering with the freedom of some individuals to exploit their employees or to destroy the natural environment (which, arguably, belongs to no one), but the result will be that everyone has the same amount of freedom.

Now, the problem with Marxism, as a capitalist says, is that it simply doesn't work. In Friedman's earlier argument. When **collectivism** has been tried, they will say Communism is a failure, and an authoritarian failure at that. There are two responses to this:

- (i) Capitalism and collectivism are not necessarily contradictory. Tony Blair was 'way' between the two. His thought was that the unjust elements of capitalism placing undue constraints on the free market. Put another way, Blair believed in a vehicle for equality. The problem with this approach, critics will say, is that it ultimately became the kind of 'hypocritical window-dressing' Friedman discussed.
- (ii) The capitalism of the nineteenth century is not the capitalism of the twentieth century, let alone the capitalism of the twenty-first century. The capitalism of today is characterised by **consumerism**. The former has caused political ruptures across the globe, has created corporations which cannot be constrained by the kind of legal framework even necessary for capitalism to work. The contemporary German sociologist Wolfgang Iser in a society of this kind, demands constant improvisation, forcing individuals to adapt to a new structure, and offers rich opportunities to oligarchs and barons while imposing on all others, in some ways like the long interregnum that began in the fifth century Dark Age.⁴⁷

The latter characteristic of consumerism, is not sustainable. In the long run, the system cannot sustain itself in creating ever more goods to satisfy ever-increasing demand. It is infinite, regardless, unless we make major changes to our lifestyles, climate

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⁴⁷ Quoted in Tooze, A, 'A General Logic of Crisis' [Review of *How Will Capitalism End?* by David Graeber and David Wengrow, *Books* 39(1), 2017), pp. 3–8.

Discussion Point:

'The First Industrial Revolution used steam power to mechanize production. The Second used electricity to create mass production. The Third used electronics and information technology to create a new mass production. A Fourth Industrial Revolution is building on the Third. It is characterised by a fusion of technologies blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres.'

...The possibilities of billions of people connected by mobile devices, with unlimited power, storage capacity, and access to knowledge are unlimited. And these possibilities are being realized by emerging technology breakthroughs in fields such as artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, biotechnology, 3D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, storage, and computing.⁴⁸

Klaus Schwab, Founder of the World Economic Forum

What social, political and economic changes do you think such new technologies will bring about? How should businesses to act more or less ethically?

Written Activity 6: Business Ethics

1. Name at least three different business stakeholders.
2. Name two ways consumers can affect business behaviour.
3. Name two ways employees can affect business behaviour.
4. Free-market economists think the market forces of _____ and _____ affect business behaviour.
5. Give a definition of globalisation.
6. Give two reasons for and against globalisation.
7. What two principles in Kantian ethics can be applied to business ethics?
8. Which economist would you describe as a 'hypocritical windmill'?

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⁴⁸ Schwab, K, 'The Fourth Industrial Revolution' in *Foreign Affairs*, 2015 [<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/2015/01/12/fourth-industrial-revolution>]

ANSWERS TO WRITTEN ACTIVITY

Written Activity 1

Question	Answer
1	Aquinas
2	telos
3	Eternal Law, Divine Law, Human Law
4	to preserve life, to reproduce, to educate children, to worship God, to contribute to society
5	through the natural order of the world (which was designed by God) and the use of reason
6	virtue theory which holds a bad consequence does not matter as long as that bad consequence is not intended

Written Activity 2

Question	Answer
1	One of the four words used by the Ancient Greeks for love. Agape is a love given without expecting anything in return. It is the love Jesus showed for his followers.
2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> e.g. 'the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath' (Mark 2:27) when Jesus heals individuals with leprosy, instead of considering them as lepers are unclean and sinners, and therefore should not be touched when Jesus saved a woman from being stoned to death by declaring she should throw the first stone' (John 8:7)
3	Antinomianism and legalism
4	Pragmatism, Relativism, Positivism, Personalism
5	The only intrinsically good thing, that is good in itself, is love. Love is good because it achieves a particular purpose.
6	If love is the outcome of one's actions, then the means or actions taken are not significant. It is only the outcome that matters.
7	an activity rather than a goal (a verb rather than a noun)

Written Activity 3

Question	Answer
1	the study of duty; an ethical theory which holds intentions or unconditional determining the rightness or wrongness of an action
2	e.g. if you go to bed early tonight, you can stay up late tomorrow
3	a principle or rule to be followed, e.g. 'Don't eat too much cake'
4	e.g. stop what you are doing, right now!
5	universal
6	Act so that persons are always treated as ends, never means.
7	freedom, immortality, God

Written Activity 4

Question	Answer
1	usefulness
2	concerned with ends rather than means
3	the most amount of happiness for the greatest number of people
4	It is teleological. This is an ethical theory that considers what is morally right or wrong in terms of the outcome of the action. Teleological ethical theories focus on the intended outcome.
5	pleasure, pain, certainty, Propinquity/Remoteness, Fecundity/Ripeness
6	utilitarianism which holds that the sole good is pleasure
7	pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all or almost all people both give a decided preference to P1, irrespective of any feeling that they have for P2
8	It promotes actions which aim to meet the preferences of those involved

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Written Activity 5

Question	Answer
1	secular
2	where a person chooses to end their own life and requests that another person do the same
3	when a person chooses to end another person's life for them because of their own beliefs
4	e.g. it contravenes the primary precept which requires us to preserve life
5	e.g. it could allow for the exploitation of the vulnerable (the slippery-slope argument) or the least worst (the most loving outcome)
6	Singer

Written Activity 6

Question	Answer
1	three of customers, employees, the local community, government
2	not buy their product/service and encourage others to do the same, call for a boycott
3	resign, join a trade union, lobby the government for changes to the law
4	supply and demand
5	Globalisation is the phenomenon of increasing global integration of different cultures and ideas.
6	For – it creates growth and jobs, and increases the availability of products and services. Against – the jobs created are sometimes dangerous and do not respect human rights, and there is greater destruction of the environment.
7	categorical imperative and not treating people as a means to an end
8	Milton Friedman

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